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The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Anyone can buy stock in a public company, but not all
shareholders are equally committed to a company’s long-term
success. In an increasingly fragmented financial world,
shareholders’ attitudes toward the companies in which they invest
vary widely, from time horizon to conviction. Faced with indexers,
short-term traders, and activists, it is more important than ever
for businesses to ensure that their shareholders are dedicated to
their missions. Today’s companies need “quality shareholders,” as
Warren Buffett called those who “load up and stick around,” or
buy large stakes and hold for long periods.
While scholars in recent years have extensively debated
indexers, short-term traders, and activists, they have paid scant
attention to quality shareholders and their critical role in
corporate finance and governance. This Article corrects this
oversight by highlighting the quality shareholder cohort. Adding
this fresh perspective confirms some of the angst about myopic
short-termism on the one hand and ignorant indexing on the
other, but rather than suggesting tighter regulation of such
behaviors, the reframing invites attention to empowering quality
shareholders. In particular, rather than taxing short-term
shareholders or passing through indexer voting rights, this
Article explains how companies could simply increase the voting
power of their quality shareholders to recognize their value and to
attract them.

* Director of the Quality Shareholders Initiative and Henry St. George Tucker III
Professor of Law, The George Washington University. This Article is part of The Quality
Shareholders Initiative at the Center for Law, Economics and Finance (C-LEAF) at
The George Washington University Law School, Professor Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Faculty Director.
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INTRODUCTION
The growing size and power of institutional investors is among
the most important contemporary trends in American corporate
life.1 In recent years, their rise has drawn special attention to
shareholder activists on the one hand and passive index funds on
the other. Lively debates address whether such powerful investors
have the right vision or conviction to faithfully discharge the trust
so many Americans have placed in them.
Regarding vision, for two decades scholars have debated
whether investors, especially activists, are too short-term oriented
for markets and managers to maintain a long-term view.2
Regarding conviction, just in the past two years scholars began to
debate whether certain kinds of investors, particularly passive
indexers, have sufficient incentives to actively monitor managers to
assure performance over any horizon.3 In a related debate on
shareholder voice in corporate affairs, some scholars propose
reducing the voting power of short-term shareholders to encourage
long-term thinking while others propose eliminating that of
indexers due to their passivity.4

1. See John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of
Twelve (Sept. 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), www.ssrn.com/abstract=3247337
(The trend of rising power of institutional investors increases “the likelihood that in the near
future roughly twelve individuals will have practical power over the majority of U.S.
public companies.”).
2. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing for increased shareholder power); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (responding
to and disagreeing with Bebchuk); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case
Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010) (arguing that increased
shareholder power would increase agency costs); Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring
Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554 (2015) (challenging the tendency to favor longterm investors over short-term investors).
3. Compare Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019) (agency cost
indictment of indexer capability), with Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV.
17 (2019) [hereinafter Fisch et al., The New Titans] (ringing theoretical defense of
indexer capability).
4. See Paul H. Edelman, Wei Jiang & Randall S. Thomas, Will Tenure Voting
Give Corporate Managers Lifetime Tenure?, 97 TEX. L. REV. 991 (2019); Dorothy S. Lund,
The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493 (2018); David J. Berger,
Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting and the U.S. Public Company,
72 BUS. LAW. 295 (2017).
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These are vital debates in corporate America, implicating
fundamental questions of the balance of power between directors
and shareholders as well as among shareholders. As such, they
stoke numerous sub-debates on every aspect of corporate
governance, such as board structures, director-officer relationships,
and shareholder rights.5 Participants see wide-ranging effects on
the national economy.6
Although such debates are sophisticated, increasingly datadriven, and involve overlapping participants, a peculiar binary
characterizes the first two that afflicts the third. The horizon debate
juxtaposes short-term against long-term visions but mutes the issue
of conviction, while the conviction debate juxtaposes passive
against active investment styles while muting the issue of horizon.
Hence in the voting debate, there are calls to limit the voting power
of either short-term shareholders or indexers, but not both.7
In fact, while time horizon and relative conviction are vital,
neither taken alone captures the nuanced reality of investor
behavior, which, at a minimum, calls for examining both features
simultaneously. This Article proposes to incorporate such
concurrent analysis of horizon and conviction into all three of these
corporate law debates. By switching from binary conceptions to one
that combines both attributes, analysis permits recognizing another
cohort of shareholders whose role has been missing in all three
debates: long-term concentrated shareholders.
While contemporary data suggest that a large plurality of
institutional shareholders qualify as short-term and another
plurality as indexers, the long-term concentrated cohort remains a
significant force in market and corporate behavior.8 It should
accordingly have an important place in debates over horizon,
conviction, and voting.
This Article draws on related literature in finance and
accounting, cited in these corporate law debates, delineating

5. See infra Section II.C.
6. See, e.g., Berger et al., supra note 4, at 307–09.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS (forthcoming Columbia
University Press 2020) (manuscript at 95–116) (on file with BYU L. Rev.) [hereinafter
CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS].
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multiple shareholder types based on both horizon and conviction.9
To visualize the combined model, blended shareholder cohorts can
be identified using a 2 x 2 diagram arraying investment conviction
across the top and investment horizon down the side to reveal
combinations of conviction and horizon.
INVESTMENT CONVICTION
Lower

Higher

Shorter

Transients

Activists

Longer

Indexers

Quality

INVESTMENT
HORIZON

To animate the approach, descriptive names are assigned:
transients to shorter-term diversifiers; indexers to longer-term
diversifiers; activists to shorter-term concentrators; and quality to
longer-term concentrators. Investment conviction is measured by
the degree of an investor’s portfolio diversification versus
concentration, with lower conviction meaning the most diversified
portfolio—epitomized by index investors.10 Investment horizon
is measured by the investor’s average holding period in
its investments.11
In corporate law scholarship, the horizon debate considers
shorter versus longer investment horizons (lower left panels of the
9. Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence on the
Behavior of Institutional Investors, 16 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28, 29 (2004) [hereinafter Bushee,
The “Right” Investors]; see Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and
Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 545 n.6 (2016).
10. See generally Martijn Cremers, Active Share and the Three Pillars of Active
Management: Skill, Conviction and Opportunity, 73 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 61 (2017) (discussing
conviction in the context of active investment management).
11. See Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment
Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 309, 330 (1998) [hereinafter Bushee, Myopic R&D].
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graph), while the conviction debate considers lower versus higher
investment concentration (upper right panels in the graph).
Combining the two would shift the terms of debate from two pure
binaries to an interactive quadrant (lower right panels of the
graph). Three immediate normative consequences follow.
First, adding conviction to the horizon debate would unlock
stalemates on fundamental issues addressing allocation of power
between management and shareholders. In recent years, after two
decades of intense discussion, the empirical evidence concerning
whether short-termism is problematic remains inconclusive.12 The
empirical uncertainty, however, may be the literature’s tendency to
overlook significant differences among investors in their relative
concentration, not merely time horizons. It may be that short-term
traders who also concentrate offset other perceived problems of
short-termism. Segmenting quality shareholders in research could
help to inform sub-debates on particular governance topics, such as
board structures and director-manager relations.13
Second, including horizon in the indexing debate will
illuminate equally fundamental issues about the allocation of
power among shareholders. The literature has tended to compare
and contrast passive indexers on the one hand with all other
shareholder types as a whole, collectively dubbed “active.”14 This
tendency overlooks distinctions among the active cohort, lumping
together activists, transients, and quality shareholders. Indexers
may well engage too little, but so might transients, perhaps
warranting giving quality shareholders a special place in corporate
decision making. Likewise, transients may compare themselves to
annualized index benchmarks, but quality shareholders do not,
focusing instead on long-term results.15
That leads to the third and most specific implication,
concerning shareholder voting. Combining shareholder conviction
and shareholder time horizon opens new approaches to this
ultimate feature of the debates’ normative implications. To date,
critics of short-termism prescribe enhanced voting rights for long12. See Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U. L.
REV. 971 (2019) (symposium issue on the horizon debate); Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Myth
of the Ideal Investor, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 425 (2018) (symposium issue on the horizon debate).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 189–203.
14. See infra text accompanying note 207.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 106–09.
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term shareholders in order to encourage longer time horizons,
while critics of indexers prescribe excluding indexers from voting
on the grounds of their passivity and ignorance; opponents of both
have pushed back accordingly.16
The critics in both such sub-debates may both be right to
propose reducing the power of transients and indexers,
respectively. But the logic of combining the two critiques identifies
a third way: voting rules that reward longevity and conviction. Call
it quality voting. It is the clearest and most important example of
the many aspects of these three debates that would change by
analyzing investor horizon and conviction in combination.
The stakes are high, as these debates touch fundamental issues
in corporate governance. With the rise of institutional investors has
come increasing shareholder voice on a wide range of matters, from
director elections to say on executive pay and influence on
corporate proposals spanning from climate change and gender
diversity to strategic direction and corporate priorities. This Article
is the first to offer a comprehensive view of quality shareholders,
pointing to how their role should reshape these three debates. It
proceeds as follows.
Part I presents the quadruple (2 x 2) typology of shareholder
cohorts based upon time horizon and relative concentration. These
are the recognized categories in the broader literature, and the two
that dominate the respective debates on horizon and conviction.
However, this discussion focuses not on the activist or indexer—
well covered in the literature and reconsidered in ensuing Parts—
but on the quality shareholder. While the quality shareholder is
well described elsewhere in corporate law scholarship, and more
broadly in financial scholarship and general media, it has been
virtually ignored in the corporate law debates on horizon,
conviction, and voting.
In the wider literature, the exemplars of quality shareholders
are Warren Buffett and his company, Berkshire Hathaway. With a
pedigree dating back to John Maynard Keynes and a following
today commanding several trillions of dollars in invested assets,
this cohort is vital. Its distinguishing features are a long-term view
and concentrated portfolios, in stark contrast to transients and
indexers. Part I introduces these investors, profiles their behavior,
16. See infra Part IV.
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and demonstrates their competitive position and enduring force in
the marketplace.17
Part II reviews the horizon debate. In thumbnail fashion, given
the age and extent of this debate, it outlines the theoretical
positions, empirical data, and normative legal implications. It then
expands upon the quadruple classification scheme and how adding
this approach can reinvigorate the horizon debate. While scholars
cannot agree on whether short-termism is a problem, critics who
believe it is may be comforted by the force of quality shareholders,
and defenders of the status quo may appreciate how such a contrast
underscores additional limits of short-term behavior. This Article
illustrates the effects of adding quality shareholders using subdebates over staggered boards and splitting versus combining the
roles of board chairman and CEO.
Part III reviews the conviction debate. In somewhat more detail,
given the nascent stage of this debate, it reviews the positions, data,
and upshot. As a critique of the current literature’s focus on
indexers versus all others (habitually called “active”), this Part
delineates the active cohort further. Among lessons that are
uncovered, scholars focus on formulaic incentive models that
assume all “active” funds measure themselves against annual
index benchmarks or growth in assets under management,18

17. Among corporate law professors, I may be uniquely suited to elaborate on Buffett
and this cohort, having spent nearly three decades immersed in their ecosystem and
publishing numerous articles and books about them. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Larry Cunningham’s Latest Book on Warren Buffett Coming Soon, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(July 21, 2014, 10:22 AM), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2014/07/larry-cunninghams-latest-book-on-warren-buffett-coming-soon.html (“Few people
have done a better job of chronicling Warren Buffett’s illustrious career than Law Professor
Lawrence Cunningham. . . . I’ve read all of [his] Buffett books and have found each to be
highly entertaining and informative.”). Work dates to the mid-1990s when I organized a law
review symposium featuring twenty-five corporate law professors dissecting my collection
of Buffett’s writings. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Conversations from the Buffett Symposium,
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 719 (1997); WARREN E. BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT:
LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA (Lawrence A. Cunningham ed., 5th ed. 2019) [hereinafter
BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS]. Recent articles include Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s
Disintermediation: A Managerial Model for the Next Generation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509
(2015); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s Blemishes: Lessons for Buffett’s Successors, Peers,
and Policy, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2016). Recent books include LAWRENCE A.
CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT: THE ENDURING VALUE OF VALUES (2014);
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & STEPHANIE CUBA, MARGIN OF TRUST: THE BERKSHIRE BUSINESS
MODEL (2020).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 216–20.
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whereas quality shareholders put no stock in such references.19 The
result is that current research ignores the relevant incentives and
must be expanded in order to increase its relevance and reliability.
Part IV turns to shareholder voting implications. This is the
most obvious topic requiring updating to incorporate quality
shareholders. After all, one upshot of the horizon debate is revived
interest in voting power based on holding periods (“tenured
voting”); one upshot of the conviction debate is new interest
in reducing indexer voting power. Logic dictates considering
voting rules that do both by increasing the voting power of
quality shareholders.
Amid the fragmentation of the shareholder base and related
debates, for instance, dual class voting structures have proliferated
to insulate companies from pressures of shareholder activists.20
Tenured voting has been advocated as a way to discourage shortterm shareholdings,21 while exclusionary voting is being proposed
to dilute the voice of indexers, seen to lack requisite incentives or
knowledge.22 All such proposals are reasonable responses to
perceived imbalances. But they are all incomplete and point to the
validity of a more complete shareholder voting protocol, one based
on both central behavioral tendencies of horizon and conviction.23
It is sometimes difficult to map theory onto practice, given the
constraints of their different realms.24 This reality may partially
explain why the quality shareholder cohort has not received the
attention it should: it has been relatively easy to model and measure
the incentives and profiles of activist shareholders and index funds,
while the quality shareholder cohort contains more numerous and
idiosyncratic members. But by providing a behavioral profile along
with data about their performance and roles, this Article offers the
promise of theorizing the practice.

19. See infra text accompanying notes 106–09.
20. See infra Section IV.A.
21. See infra Section IV.B.
22. See infra Section IV.C.
23. See infra Section IV.D.
24. See Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925, 925 (1994); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An
Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003).
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I. QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS
This Part reviews the rise of the institutional investor industry,
noting legal scholarship reviewing it and ensuing shareholder
fragmentation. It reviews attempts to classify this fragmented
shareholder base, highlighting one that delineates according to
normatively significant dimensions of both horizon and conviction.
The combination introduces a new shareholder cohort to
longstanding corporate law debates: the quality shareholder. Its
behavioral attributes are explained, along with the cohort’s
competitive position, its relative performance, and the advantages
this approach offers to companies and fellow investors.
A. Fragmentation
In decades past, most shareholders were individuals. In 1965,
for example, institutional investors held $436 billion of $1.4 trillion
in total market capitalization, with nearly $1 trillion owned by
individual households.25 Less than 15% of the market, or $100
billion, was held by the day’s mutual funds, pension funds, and
insurance companies (respectively holding $36, $43, and $21
billion; or 5%, 6%, and 3%).26
With shareholders so dispersed, prominent corporate theorists
had for decades described the challenge of corporate life as the
“separation of ownership from control.”27 It would be difficult for
shareholders to act collectively and often irrational for them to
incur the costs necessary to monitor corporate management.28
In this structure, managers held the balance of power over
corporate destiny—in American corporate finance, there were

25. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF
1965–1974 (June 9, 2016).
26. Id.
27. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) (arguing that the U.S. corporate structure
created agency problems).
28. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (explaining
the difficulties of collective action).
THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES
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strong managers yet weak owners.29 Corporate law’s principal task,
then, was to mitigate the attendant agency costs.30
Post-1965, however, trends moved from individual
to institutional ownership and, by the 1990s, those trends had
become so powerful that corporate law scholars came to believe
that they might mitigate these historical problems.31 A promising
agenda emerged to enable institutional investors to monitor
management more effectively.32 Guidance was provided on what
to expect, including realistic cautionary notes, but in general
the rise of institutional investors held out great promise for
corporate governance.33
These hopes, however, have been disappointed, as the rise of
institutional investors altered but did not resolve the longstanding
challenges. Today, institutions command the vast majority of the
$30+ trillion in total market capitalization.34 Among these are
mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, together
commanding a substantial portion (respectively, $9.1 trillion,
$2.3 trillion, and $811 billion).35 They present the old problems of
agency costs in new ways due to three critical changes in the
institutional investor landscape that have occurred in the past
two decades.
Foremost, a large and growing percentage of shares are held by
indexers. Indexing involves buying proportional stakes in every
stock listed in some benchmark index, such as the S&P 500 or
Russell 3000, without doing any research or being exposed to

29. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
30. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
31. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).
32. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991).
33. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991).
34. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 2005–2015 (June 9, 2016); BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
SECOND QUARTER 2018, at 130 (Sept. 20, 2018).
35. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: SECOND QUARTER 2018, at 130 (Sept. 20, 2018).

11

1.CUNNINGHAM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/9/2021 8:56 PM

46:1 (2020)

anything but the market risk-return. Popularized by the late Jack
Bogle, indexing was a marginal practice through the 1990s, but
today is a familiar approach. Bogle’s company, Vanguard, is a
household name. Large indexers command trillions of assets,
representing one-quarter to one-third or more of total U.S. public
company equity.
Second is the substantial shortening of average holding periods,
indicative of increased trading for arbitrage, momentum strategies,
and other short-term drivers. The best-selling financial author
Michael Lewis dramatized the stakes in his 2014 book, Flash Boys,
and the pace of acceleration continues with sustained technological
advances in computing algorithms, artificial intelligence, and
machine learning.36 Average holding periods shortened
significantly from the mid-1960s through the early- or mid-2000s;37
while the average has held steady since, this appears to be due to
how the shorter horizons of many are offset by the more permanent
holdings of the indexers.38
Third is the rise of activism. Shareholder gadflies have roamed
corporate America since the Gilbert brothers popularized the
practice in the 1950s.39 And from the 1970s through the 1990s,
incumbent managers faced constant threats to corporate control
from rival firms, takeover artists, and colorful raiders such as Carl
Icahn and Nelson Peltz.40 But it is only in the past two decades that
a vast pool of capital developed among specialty firms, dubbed
shareholder activists, dedicated to the practice and featuring a

36. See Tom C.W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
531 (2019).
37. Anne M. Tucker, The Long and the Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund
Investment Time Horizons, 43 J. CORP. L. 581, 587 (2018) (through early 2000s); Edelman et al.,
supra note 4, at 996 (through 2007).
38. K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387, 389 (2018) [hereinafter Cremers & Sepe,
Institutional Investors].
39. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Stephanie Cuba, Annual Shareholder Meetings:
From Populist to Virtual, FIN. HIST., Fall 2018, at 14.
40. See generally KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS (John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Louis Lowenstein & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988) (surveying a variety of research
regarding hostile takeovers and the effects takeovers have on acquirers, shareholders, and
other players).
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well-developed playbook, a cadre of professional advisers, and
repeat players such as Bill Ackman, Dan Loeb, and Paul Singer.41
Facing these forces, it has been easy to overlook the enduring
power of the traditional cohort of individual and institutional
investors who prefer old-fashioned techniques famously known as
buy-and-holds. The style is epitomized by Warren Buffett and
Berkshire Hathaway and boasts such notable historical figures as
John Maynard Keynes and Benjamin Graham, along with such
legacy names as John Neff of Wellington Management or Thomas
Rowe Price and his eponymous firm, T. Rowe Price Group Inc.42
B. Classification
Today’s diverse shareholder base can be classified in a variety
of ways. Which approach is appropriate depends on the purpose of
the classification, such as the viewpoint of potential customers,
regulators, or researchers.
An obvious formal starting point distinguishes individuals
from institutions, which is both straightforward and useful. This
delineation is useful for fundamental issues such as the role of
government. For example, a government agency might plausibly
be charged with developing educational programs for individuals
but not institutions and likewise be asked to provide oversight for
institutional investors but not individuals.43
A classic formal delineation of institutional investors considers
legal forms of organization. Examples include banks, hedge funds,
index funds, investment advisers, insurance companies, and
mutual funds. Such a scheme is useful for many purposes, such as
determining beneficiaries and fiduciary duties, regulatory
restrictions, and competitive pressures.44
In more functional terms, investment strategy is a way to sort
institutional investors, such as technical versus fundamental,

41. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY,
ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 1–35 (William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2015)
[hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM].
42. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 13, 15, 104.
43. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025 (2009).
44. Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 29.
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growth versus value, or quantitative versus qualitative.45 Those
alternatives would be of special interest when investigating relative
investment appeal.46
Another functional approach would examine trading behavior.
For instance, how different shareholders use information may be
important when studying market efficiency47 or formulating
securities regulations.48 Helpful categories include insiders, market
makers, noise traders, liquidity traders, and information traders.49
These groups differ in terms of their access to and use of
information, with significant effects on market performance and
optimal disclosure laws.50
A behavior-based classification of investors might incorporate
such varying approaches to handling information. The behavioral
division might also consider the central questions in the corporate
law debates over time horizons and conviction levels.
In the early 1990s, for example, Harvard Business School
professor Porter compared institutional investor behavior in the
United States with counterparts in Germany and Japan, whose
economies were operating more productively.51 He reported a U.S.

45. Institutional investors follow a variety of different investment strategies (such as
value, growth, or income) or different target sizes (such as small or large cap). Some funds
combine these features, classifying as large value, large growth, small value, or small growth.
They may rivet on particular sectors or geographic regions or attempt to buy small stakes in
essentially every company in the stock market.
46. Some have objectives in addition to traditional shareholder returns, such as
promoting the interests of labor. See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS
SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018); Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate
Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN.
STUD. 187 (2012); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993).
47. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
48. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 722 (2006).
49. Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in
Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1015, 1029–30 (2014).
50. Insiders have company information, but securities laws limit their right to use it;
market makers may have the information, but their trades support balancing supply and
demand; noise traders chase fads; liquidity traders act for nonfundamental reasons, such as
funding needs or calibrating to an index; and information traders do the heavy lifting of
digesting and acting on information. See id. at 1030–31.
51. Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1992, at 4.
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propensity toward either indexing or trading compared to the more
concentrated and patient investor model prevalent abroad.52
In the late 1990s, University of Pennsylvania Wharton Business
School professor Bushee extended Porter’s analysis.53 Bushee noted
that Porter’s critique overlooked the significant group of U.S.
investors who both concentrate and hold—a blind spot that persists
in the corporate law literature.54 But he stressed that Porter’s insight
warranted focusing on differences among shareholders
represented by two variables: time horizon and conviction.55
Bushee identified three categories of institutional investors
as follows:
• “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover
and own small stakes in portfolio companies;
• “dedicated” institutions, which provide stable ownership and
take large positions in individual firms; and
• “quasi-indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small
stakes (similar to an index strategy).56

Bushee’s empirical work was straightforward. He computed
various measures of horizon and conviction: horizon by quarterly
portfolio turnover as well as portion held more than two years; and
conviction by average percentage ownership of investees, the
percentage of investees representing at least a 5% share of the
portfolio, and the average size of each investment.57 He then
combined the horizon and conviction computations to capture the
two factors together.
With that ranking, Bushee clustered the results into the three
shareholder types and identified exemplars of each. Transients,
with short time horizons and small stakes, are typified by Numeric,
a fund that specializes in exploiting dynamic stock market activity,
not fundamental investment analysis of business; quasi-indexers,
which buy small stakes in 500 to 3000 stocks representing an entire
52. Id. at 6–7.
53. Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 29–30.
54. Id. at 30; see also infra Parts II & III.
55. Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 29–30 (using the words “stability”
and “stakes” rather than “horizon” or “conviction,” respectively, but synonymously).
56. Id. Shareholder activists are introduced into this schematic in Section I.C. See infra
text accompanying note 71.
57. Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 30.
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market basket, are exemplified by CalPERS, the large California
pension fund; and dedicated shareholders, those who buy large stakes
and hold them for long periods, are epitomized by Warren Buffett’s
Berkshire Hathaway, he said.58
Professor Bushee’s work has been widely influential. For
example, decades after publication, consulting firm McKinsey &
Company offered a similar take.59 It called equivalent categories by
different names: intrinsic instead of dedicated, mechanical instead of
quasi-indexers, and traders instead of transients.60 But the analytical
utility of the McKinsey and Bushee lexicons is the same and offers
a valuable lens for purposes ranging from evaluating investor
performance to the expected handling of information and the
likelihood of different shareholder cohorts being informed
participants in shareholder voting.
In finance scholarship, numerous empirical studies develop
tests to identify shareholders who rank high in combined horizon
duration and portfolio concentration. For instance, University of
Connecticut finance professor Borochin and researcher Jie Yang
developed such a database to determine the effects of a company’s
shareholder base on its governance structure and economic value.61
Finance professors Cremers of the University of Notre Dame and
Pareek of the University of Nevada created a large data set of all
institutional investors dating back to 1980, presenting, quarter by
quarter, each shareholder’s concentration and average holding
period.62 Cremers and Pareek have been using their data to conduct
a variety of tests concerning relative investor performance.63
58. Id. at 30–31.
59. Robert N. Palter, Werner Rehm & Jonathan Shih, Communicating with the Right
Investors, MCKINSEY ON FIN., Summer 2011, at 57, 58–60.
60. Id.
61. Paul Borochin & Jie Yang, The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm
Valuation and Governance, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 171 (2017) (including a robust propensity score
model for identifying quality shareholders, dubbed “DED” for “dedicated” after Bushee in
the model).
62. Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment
Skill of High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 288 (2016)
(explaining that the concept of “active share” measures relative concentration of a portfolio
compared to a benchmark index, with a pure index active share equal to zero and a
completely concentrated portfolio equal to one).
63. The data and related research are posted on the University of Notre Dame website.
Active Share: Academic Research, U. NOTRE DAME, https://activeshare.nd.edu/academicresearch/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
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In legal scholarship, Professor Belinfanti canvassed multiple
alternative methods of classifying investors.64 Belinfanti features
Professor Bushee’s method prominently, describing it as a
“contemporary” method to “drill down” beyond conventional
classifications to focus on important behaviors and propensities.65
Similarly, Professors Dallas and Barry use Bushee’s
classification system in their empirical work on shareholder voting
regimes.66 For purposes of corporate law, they stress that what
matters most is behavior, particularly time horizons and conviction
levels.67 Dallas and Barry summarize the implications of Bushee’s
classification scheme for this purpose as follows:
Transient shareholders . . . have the least incentive to
“understand drivers of long-run value.”
Dedicated investors . . . have the greatest incentive to think
about the long term and to take an active role in corporate
governance and monitoring of portfolio companies. . . .
Quasi-indexers fall between the other two categories.
They . . . have good incentives to think about the company’s longterm value, but do not have good incentives to be involved in
corporate governance and oversight. 68

Since Bushee developed his classification system in the late
1990s and early 2000s, the activist shareholder segment developed
into a distinctive cohort.69 Within Bushee’s system, they might be
classified as transients if they held for short periods and in low
concentrations. But most are highly concentrated in their positions,
and sometimes even hold for above-average periods, though their
time horizon is routinely portrayed in the literature as short-term.70
64. Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 789, 818–21 (2014).
65. Id. at 820.
66. Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 625–26 (2016). Part IV of this Article addresses
the literature on shareholder voting regimes and normative implications for this
Article’s analysis.
67. See id. at 571. Behavior changes over time. For example, Bushee estimates that
about one-fifth of institutional investors change their Bushee classification over a three-year
period. See id. at n.116 (citing correspondence between Bushee and Dallas).
68. Id. at 625–27 (citations omitted).
69. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM, supra note 41.
70. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007) (“Hedge funds come close to being the
archetypal short-term investor.”); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door:
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Given that shareholder activists adopt a unique approach to
engagement by public campaigns for corporate change,71
separately classifying this cohort is analytically useful. The
scholarship in the corporate horizon debate provides behavioral
profiles of activists, transients, and indexers, to be reviewed in Parts
II and III. It has not developed a behavioral profile of the quality
shareholder, though this cohort features in other strands of
corporate law scholarship. Accordingly, this Part will continue by
presenting such a profile.
C. Behavior
Professor Bushee named Buffett’s company, Berkshire
Hathaway, as exemplifying the “dedicated” or quality
shareholder.72 Other empirical research identifying quality
shareholders invariably places Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway at
or near the top.73 Many other corporate law scholars have echoed
the point, including Professors Dallas and Barry in their use of the
Bushee model in their empirical work.74 Professors Choi and
Pritchard, in their discussion of the various behaviors that diverse
shareholders exhibit, suggest that Buffett is the “paradigm” of such
an approach.75 Buffett’s standing as a model of the patient,
committed shareholder has been particularly common among
scholars of trust law, where investment theory plays a central role.76
Based on my extensive research and writings with and about
Buffett over the past three decades, I concur in the conclusion and

The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 573–74 (2016)
(observing that hedge funds might be the “archetypal” short-term shareholder but noting
that many mutual funds are too).
71. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM, supra note 41.
72. Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 31.
73. E.g., Borochin & Yang, supra note 61, at 174–75; CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY
SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 104.
74. Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 626.
75. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1, 15 n.65 (2003).
76. E.g., Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and
the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1190–91 (2008) (sharply contrasting
Buffett with indexers as well as transients, drawing on prominent detailed accounts of
Buffett’s philosophy, including my work); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law
Reform: How Prudent is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 873–74
n.121 (2010) (noting my views on Buffett).
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can explain the behavior.77 First, while Bushee’s reference was to
Buffett as a shareholder, it is equally true that Buffett as CEO of
Berkshire Hathaway consciously cultivated such a cohort among its
shareholders.78 He began doing so two decades before Bushee
minted his classification, when Buffett referred to Bushee’s cohort
of “dedicated” shareholders as “quality” shareholders.79 Since
“quality” is also an adjective often used by corporate scholars to
designate a variety of shareholder behaviors, it is the term this
Article will use.80
While Buffett is certainly an exemplar, he is part of a long
tradition extending back many decades and will leave a legacy of
legions of followers in his wake. As for predecessors, consider John
Maynard Keynes, the distinguished economist, scholar and
investor. Keynes stated his philosophy, based on years of
experience and reflection: “I get more and more convinced that the
right method in investment is to put fairly large sums” in select
enterprises and that it is “a mistake to think that one limits one’s
risk by spreading too much between [diverse] enterprises.”81
Rather, Keynes avowed: “I believe now that successful investment

77. See BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS, supra note 17.
78. See id. at 185–88.
79. See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 849, 878–80 (2012) [hereinafter Rock, Eugenics] (quoting Letter from Warren E. Buffett,
Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway to S’holders (Mar. 14, 1984),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1983.html)
(Buffett’s
description
of
Berkshire’s goal and strategy to attract “high quality shareholders”); BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS,
supra note 17, at 185–88 (“attracting quality shareholders”).
80. E.g., Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion
of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 519 (2005)
(quoting DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., DRAFT REGULATIONS ON THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL
REVIEW AND DIRECTORS’ REPORT: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 5–6 (2004)) (U.K. government
official favoring “high quality shareholder engagements”); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch,
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1164 n.114 (2016) (referring to shareholder proposals as being of “higheror lower- quality”); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863,
913 (2013) (referring to the relative quality of shareholder activist proposals). The
term
should be compared with that of quality investing, referring to an investment strategy
seeking to find high-quality businesses that may be purchased at a reasonable price. See infra
text accompanying note 89.
81. ALLEN C. BENELLO, MICHAEL VAN BIEMA & TOBIAS E. CARLISLE, CONCENTRATED
INVESTING: STRATEGIES OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST CONCENTRATED VALUE INVESTORS 35
(2016) (citing JOHN F. WASIK, KEYNES’S WAY TO WEALTH: TIMELESS INVESTMENT LESSONS
FROM THE GREAT ECONOMIST (McGraw Hill 2014)).
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depends on . . . a steadfast holding . . . in fairly large units through
thick and thin, perhaps for several years . . . .”82
Professor Westbrook noted Keynes’ influence on the
Berkshire/Buffett style, stressing patience and conviction as
defining features.83 On concentration, she notes that diversification
is “close to godliness” on Wall Street, but that Buffett holds the
opposite conviction.84 On the long-term view, Westbrook explains
how Buffett consciously cultivated fellow shareholders with such a
view because it was so important to his own approach. She
explained: “In a world in which investors are told that seconds
matter and trading is easy, he advocates buying Berkshire stock
and then not touching it again.”85
Another Buffett predecessor was Benjamin Graham, his
professor at Columbia University and a renowned investor and
educator.86 Graham taught Buffett—and two generations of
followers—the art of value investing.87 This involves conducting
fundamental analyses of businesses to estimate their value and then
buying only the small number that can be obtained at a price
substantially below estimated value.88 A modern variation on
Graham’s technique is called quality investing, or growth
investing, which expands the pool to include buying stocks at a

82. Id. at 52 (citing David Chambers, Elroy Dimson & Justin Foo, Keynes the Stock
Market Investor: A Quantitative Analysis, 50 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 843 (2015)). Keynes
managed investments for Cambridge University’s King’s College from 1927 to 1945. He
concentrated as much as half the portfolio in five companies and held them at least five years
apiece. See id. at 48, 51. Despite working in a challenging era that included the Great
Depression and World War II, returns were impressive: a compound annual growth rate of
9.12% in contrast to the broad U.K. market return of negative 0.89%. Id. at 58.
83. Amy Deen Westbrook, Warren Buffett’s Corporation: Reconnecting Owners and
Managers, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 515, 544–45 (2009).
84. Id. at 544.
85. Id. at 535 (citing Letters from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire
Hathaway Inc. to S’holders, in WARREN E. BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT:
LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA (Lawrence A. Cunningham ed., 2d ed. 2008) at 77–115).
86. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR (1959); BENJAMIN GRAHAM &
DAVID DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS (1962).
87. For my analysis of the principles that Graham taught Buffett, see generally
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, HOW TO THINK LIKE BENJAMIN GRAHAM AND INVEST LIKE
WARREN BUFFETT (2001); see also Warren Buffett, The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville,
HERMES (1985) for a description of how Buffett and other students of Graham practiced the
art of investing based on Graham’s teachings.
88. BRUCE N. GREENWALD, JUDD KAHN, PAUL D. SONKIN & MICHAEL VAN BIEMA,
VALUE INVESTING: FROM GRAHAM TO BUFFETT AND BEYOND (2001).
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price that is low in relation to reasonably anticipated growth in
intrinsic value.89
Professor Lowenstein distilled the Buffett/Graham approach in
his corporate law scholarship.90 Lowenstein stressed that this
approach to investing is based on fundamental business analysis—
neither indexing nor trading. The principal criteria are conviction,
by holding fewer than twenty stocks, and patience, by holding
stocks for an average of at least two years.91
Quality shareholders adopt a wide variety of diverse strategies
for buying, holding or selling, and engaging with management.
Buying decisions may be made in accordance with the tenets of
Graham’s pure value investing, the growth investing extension, or
some other variant.92 In all cases, however, the investment decision
is based upon fundamental business analysis—neither trading
activity nor indexing.93 Concentration is invariably the result.94
Likewise, quality shareholders may adopt different policies
concerning whether and when to sell shares. Although most
usually follow Buffett and prefer permanent holding periods,95
some may sell when price rises to a significant multiple of value.96
Finally, quality shareholders have varying propensities concerning
engagement, though their tendency is monitoring at a distance and
consulting when asked.97 Buffett is again seen to exemplify this
89. See CORNELIUS C. BOND, T. ROWE PRICE: THE MAN, THE COMPANY, AND THE
INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY (2019); LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, TORKELL T. EIDE & PATRICK
HARGREAVES, QUALITY INVESTING (2016); Clifford S. Asness, Andrea Frazzini & Lasse Heje
Pedersen, Quality Minus Junk, 24 REV. ACCT. STUD. 34 (2019); Robert Novy-Marx, Quality
Investing (2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9480/
0c35aff62f304d42ac8a9112cd9f40d8e59f.pdf.
90. Louis Lowenstein, Searching for Rational Investors in a Perfect Storm, 30 J. CORP. L.
539, 547 (2005). Professor Lowenstein was a close personal friend of Warren Buffett and longtime investor in Berkshire Hathaway. His son, Roger, a prominent journalist and author,
wrote the classic biography, Warren Buffett: The Making of An American Capitalist.
91. Id. at 547.
92. See JOHN TRAIN, MONEY MASTERS OF OUR TIME 306 (2000).
93. ROBERT G. HAGSTROM, THE WARREN BUFFETT PORTFOLIO: MASTERING THE POWER
OF THE FOCUS INVESTMENT STRATEGY 31 (1999).
94. See ALLEN C. BENELLO, MICHAEL VAN BIEMA & TOBIAS E. CARLISLE,
CONCENTRATED INVESTING (2017).
95. See BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS, supra note 17.
96. E.g., JOHN NEFF, ON INVESTING 116–17 (1999) (Neff, a quality shareholder,
explaining that “You Don’t Have to Buy and Hold Forever”).
97. See ROBERT P. MILES, WARREN BUFFETT WEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL
METHODS USED BY THE WORLD’S GREATEST INVESTOR 33–34 (2004).
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stance. Professors Bratton and McCahery put it this way: “The
model block owner is the legendary Warren Buffett, a fundamental
value investor who takes large, under-diversified, long-term
positions; monitors carefully; but does not attempt to interfere with
the formulation or implementation of the business plan, except in
a crisis.”98
Manifestations of Buffett’s approach include Berkshire’s large
long-term stakes in a relatively small number of companies.
Exquisite examples of stakes still held today are nearly 20% of
American Express, initially acquired in 1962; nearly 10% of CocaCola, initially acquired in 1984; and around 8% of Wells Fargo,
initially acquired in 1989.99 All of these companies have faced
business challenges during Berkshire’s ownership and Buffett has
helped behind the scenes, as well as on the board of Coca-Cola for
many years, but never interfered publicly.100
Concerning conviction, quality shareholders view themselves
as part owners of a business. Such an ownership sense requires
conviction, reflected in thorough research and disciplined
decisions. As put by the venerable firm of Ruane Cunniff, founded
by another Graham student and Buffett classmate, William Ruane:
“We take pride and pleasure in investigating a company from
all angles, doing the kind of on-the-ground, primary research
that an enterprising journalist might do.”101 Quality
shareholders concentrate, often limiting their portfolios to some
twenty companies.102

98. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1920 (1995).
99. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., ANNUAL REPORT (2019).
100. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & STEPHANIE CUBA, MARGIN OF TRUST 78 (2019).
In 2014, a shareholder activist launched a public campaign challenging Coca-Cola’s
executive compensation plan and urged Berkshire to support it. Instead, Buffett privately
engaged outside of the spotlight to resolve the issue. In 2016 concerning American Express,
Buffett declined an overture from a shareholder activist seeking change, favoring direct
consultation with the long-time chief executive officer.
101. Philosophy, RUANE, CUNNIFF & GOLDFARB, https://www.ruanecunniff.com/
Philosophy (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
102. For example, Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb:
Our small collection of investments bears little resemblance to the S&P 500 or any
other index. In fact, our top ten investments often account for >60% of the value of
our portfolios. The S&P 500 may be relevant for assessing our performance over
the long term, but it has no bearing on how we construct our portfolios.
Id.
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Concerning time horizon, quality shareholders are fond
of following Buffett in saying their favorite holding period
is forever.103 They are not motivated to beat the market in any given
year but to generate returns over long periods of time. Since
quality shareholders are generally risk averse, sustained patience
reduces both reinvestment risk and expense risk.104 Owning
outstanding companies for very long periods not only limits risk
but reaps the benefits of compounding, a cherished principle of
quality shareholders.105
Quality shareholders reject the prevailing fashion of comparing
their annual return with some benchmark index.106 They eschew
reference to the relative volatility of the indexes.107 Quality
shareholders object to the common habit of distinguishing between
passive index funds on one hand and all others, dubbed “active,”
on the other.108 They invest for, and measure performance
103. See BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS, supra note 17.
104. On reinvestment risk, selling shares results in capital needing to be reinvested, and
finding new outstanding investments is time consuming and difficult. On expense risk,
trading and taxes are immediate costs of selling, disguising the stated nominal returns that
draw attention.
105. See Letter from Warren Buffett to Partners of Buffett P’ship, Ltd. (Jan. 18, 1963) (on
file with author).
106. E.g., Fundsmith:
Over a sufficient period of time, you will no doubt want to assess our
performance against a range of benchmarks—the performance of cash, bonds,
equities and other funds, and we will assist you in that process by providing
comparisons.
However, we do not think it is helpful to make comparisons with movements
in other asset prices or indices over the short term, as we are not trying to provide
short term performance.
FUNDSMITH EQUITY FUND, OWNER’S MANUAL 10 (2018).
107. For example, Cedar Rock Capital Partners: “We make no attempt to control volatility
relative to any benchmark. We aim to achieve positive returns over the long term, with a strong
capital preservation bias.” CEDAR ROCK CAPITAL, http://www.cedarrockcapital.com
(last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
108. For example, Baillie Gifford:
We are not passive investors who think that current share prices capture the future
prospects of companies. We don’t believe that investment decisions can be made
on numbers alone, even by super computers and complex algorithms. Passive has
its place, providing low-cost market access with, on average, better after fees
results than active managers.
However, it has little to do with the process of allocating capital to innovative
companies—though on that point it has much in common with many active
managers. We are not a typical active manager either: we believe this term has
become a one-size-fits-all description which is very unhelpful for investors. It has
been hijacked by many fund managers who think it suggests ‘activity’ and simply

23

1.CUNNINGHAM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/9/2021 8:56 PM

46:1 (2020)

over, many years, not annually as is the obsession of
many commentators.109
The philosophy of quality shareholders can be further
illuminated by contrasting it with that of indexers. Indexers believe
in efficient markets—that share prices reflect future prospects.
Quality shareholders doubt that numbers capture all, whether
computed by humans, powerful computers, or elaborate
algorithms. Quality shareholders conduct the fundamental analysis
that is necessary to promote stock market efficiency. In their view,
passive funds free ride off of that work.110
The Keynes-Graham-Buffett model continues to attract a large
following of quality shareholders. Many are powerful names
recognized in the institutional investor world. To illustrate, the
following lists several top quality shareholders as identified by
Professors Borochin and Yang111:

being different from an index. The reality is that much of this activity has more to
do with trying to outsmart other investors than with the creative deployment
of capital, and that defining active as being different from an index is to start in
the wrong place. This is why most active investors fail to deliver returns that
outperform passive investment strategies over the long term. They’re not even
trying to do the fundamental job of investing.
Actual Investors, BAILLIE GIFFORD, https://www.bailliegifford.com/en/uk/aboutus/actual-investors/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
109. Gardner Russo & Gardner:
[Portfolio concentration] may mean temporary depression of market values for
companies . . . if and when they are out of favor. However, reduced share prices
as a result of market sentiment do not necessarily relate to reduced prospects for
our companies’ operations. Accordingly, we prefer not to move from sector to
sector, following the bubble of the moment. Rather, we prefer to patiently await
the market’s return to recognition of our businesses’ intrinsic value. . . . [T]his may
mean that our portfolios undergo periodic under-performance versus the market
as a whole.
. . . Because our core positions can be heavily weighted, performance of our
portfolios can be dampened by market sentiment, which we regard, however, as
immaterial to our investments’ long-term potential.
Part 2A of Form ADV: Firm Brochure, GARDNER RUSSO & GARDNER LLC (Mar. 27, 2020),
http://files.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Common/crd_iapd_Brochure.aspx?BRC
HR_VRSN_ID=630438.
110. See HOWARD MARKS, INVESTING WITHOUT PEOPLE (2018).
111. Borochin & Yang, supra note 61, at 175.
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Top Quality
Berkshire Hathaway
Capital Research & Management
Fidelity Management & Research
Harris Associates (Oakmark Funds)
State Farm Insurance
Southeastern Asset Management
Wellington Management
Like Berkshire, these quality shareholders have large parts of
their portfolios invested in sizable stakes of major companies held
for many years. Examples include Capital Research in Abbott Labs;
Fidelity in SalesForce; Harris in Tenet Health; State Farm in Air
Products; Southeastern in Graham Holdings; and Wellington in
Marsh & McLennan and PNC Financial.112 Other examples of such
quality shareholders and stakes are the positions of Franklin
Resources in Roper and Massachusetts Financial in Accenture.113
In short, quality shareholders embrace a philosophy of
investing characterized by patience and focus. Despite their
passion for this approach, however, quality shareholders face
relentless competitive pressures.
D. Competition and Performance
Today’s institutional investors face pressure to favor indexing
or transience. Compensation of fund managers is often based on
annual returns, so the question becomes whether an investor beat
the market for a given year or not. In such an environment, pressure
is substantial to diversify widely on the one hand and, on the other,
to chase returns by rapid trading. While quality shareholders reject
and resist such approaches, the result is a rising portion of indexers
and transients compared to quality shareholders.
The effects of this intensive environment are reflected in
estimates of the relative size of these cohorts. The number of
different indexes has proliferated—at least sixty major ones by one
count, with Morningstar alone designating at least 300 different

112. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8.
113. Id.
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indexes.114 Self-described index funds easily manage at least 20% of
total market capitalization, a figure that rises to as much as 40% if
counting funds that hug indexes without describing themselves as
index funds.115
Transient holders are numerous, reflected in high share
turnover. In the past two decades, average holding periods for
hedge funds have fallen to under one year and for mutual funds
under two.116 In recent years, overall average time horizons have
remained unchanged, though this is likely due to the rise of
indexers, which trade infrequently, offset by the rise in transients,
which trade often.117 Together, this transient cohort represents
perhaps as much as 40% of total market capitalization as well.118
At the other extreme, activists in aggregate command relatively
small stakes, not likely more than 5% of all, though they
strategically leverage their power during campaigns. Quality
shareholders make up the rest.119 While small overall—perhaps
15% of all equity—this cohort can be mobilized for amplified

114. Families of benchmarks propagate multiple indexes, now numbering as many as
sixty. These include Dow Jones (at least six: DJ Industrial Average, DJ US Select Dividend,
DJ Wilshire 4500, and DJ Wilshire 5000); FTSE (four: FTSE High Dividend Yield, FTSE RAFI
US 100, and Mid Small 1500); NASDAQ (two: NASDAQ 100 and the NASDAQ Composite);
and Schwab (two, including the Schwab 1000 and Schwab Small Cap). Dozens more are
offered by several behemoths delineating among small, mid, and large cap plus their value
and growth components: MSCI (fifteen different ones), S&P (fourteen) and Russell (thirteen).
115. Recently, total market cap of the Russell 3000 was about $30 trillion. Of that,
operators of the largest passive indexers commanded nearly half, at around $14 trillion
(though some run stock-picking funds too). Pension funds as a group held about one-third
or $9 trillion, much prone to quasi-indexing, though some to dedication. Activist hedge
funds own a sliver—around $100 billion or 1%—though they back that capital with powerful
game-changing strategies for companies. Given the high level of aggregate share turnover—
average holding periods barely near one year—many on the typical shareholder list do not
stay a long time, making for a sizable portion of transients. More specifically, five of the
largest activist hedge funds command in aggregate perhaps $100 billion (Ichan, Third Point,
ValueAct, Pershing, Trian) whereas the largest four financial institutions manage $14 trillion
(BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard, and Fidelity). Among pension funds, the five largest
together run nearly $1 trillion (CalPERs, CALSTRs, STRS Ohio). The quality investing cohort
represents the rest. Yet the power of even such relatively small stakes is immense. For
perspective, the largest listed companies now boast market caps around $1 trillion and many
smaller ones around $4 to $10 billion.
116. See sources cited supra note 37.
117. See supra text accompanying note 38.
118. See supra note 115.
119. See supra note 115.
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influence, sometimes playing important roles in corporate
power struggles.120
What leads a particular investor, or institution, to adopt one
investment strategy or another is partly a function of personality
and partly of expected returns.121 For nearly two decades, debate
has raged around whether stock indexing or stock picking is a
superior strategy, often delineating further into types of broad
indexes (by size, sector, or geography) with stock pickers
competing against that benchmark.122 Debate dates to a 1997 article
by Mark Carhart, then a professor of finance at the University of
Southern California, finding no evidence of successful mutual fund
stock pickers.123
Ensuing research contributed to what became conventional
wisdom, such as: average active funds underperform the market
after fees;124 top fund performance doesn’t persist;125 and, while
some managers are skilled, few deliver on that value for customers
after fees.126 Yet debate continues, and Buffett won a famous bet
siding with indexers over hedge funds—at least those hedge funds
that charge particularly high fees.127 Multiple editions of
120. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 19–27 (giving
examples of quality shareholders’ roles in activist campaigns concerning Pernod Ricard,
Ashland Global Holdings, and United Technologies).
121. See Henrik Cronqvist, Stephan Siegel & Frank Yu, Value Versus Growth Investing:
Why Do Different Investors Have Different Styles?, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 333 (2015).
122. See Martijn Cremers, Jon Fulkerson & Timothy B. Riley, Challenging the
Conventional Wisdom on Active Management: A Review of the Past 20 Years of Academic Literature
on Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 75 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 8 (2019).
123. Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 (1997)
(finding that the empirical evidence did “not support the existence of skilled or informed
mutual fund portfolio managers”). Michael Jensen conducted an earlier kindred study.
Michael Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945–1964, 23 J. FIN. 389 (1968).
124. William Sharpe, The Arithmetic of Active Management, 47 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 7 (1991).
125. Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 (1997).
126. Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual
Fund Returns, 65 J. FIN. 1915 (2010).
127. In 2008, Buffett bet a hedge fund manager the S&P 500 would, over the ensuing
ten years, outperform, after fees, any hedge fund portfolio the manager cared to assemble.
See BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS, supra note 17, at 180–83. The manager assembled a fund of funds,
a configuration charging multiple layers of high fees. During the first three years, the S&P
lagged the fund, but by bet’s end, the S&P won. If many took from the bet the lesson that
indexers are always superior to non-indexed investing, that is a mistake. The primary point
was to stress that ordinary individuals are almost certainly better off, given the risks and
fees, of staking their savings in index funds rather than entrusting it to high-cost
hedge funds.
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best-selling books continue to showcase dueling university
professors: University of Pennsylvania finance professor Siegel has
repeatedly shown that buy-and-hold works,128 while Princeton
University finance professor Malkiel continues to release new
editions of the book that legitimized indexing as a strategy.129
Changes in shareholder demographics during the past two
decades, including increased competition and lower fees, have
produced a new strand of research challenging these conventional
views. For instance, there is evidence that the average active fund
does outperform an equivalent index;130 some top-performance
records do persist;131 and a sizable cohort of managers with
particular traits demonstrate skill that covers their fees.132 Among
those traits are conviction and patience—the defining traits of
quality shareholders.
E. Advantages
So far, this Article has discussed the fragmentation,
classification, behavior, and performance of different shareholders.
Each shareholder segment adds unique value: activists promote
management accountability; index funds enable millions to enjoy
market returns at low cost; and traders offer liquidity.
With such advantages, however, come disadvantages: activists
become overzealous; indexers lack resources to understand specific
company details; and traders induce a short-term focus. Quality
shareholders balance the base and counteract these downsides.
As to curbing overzealous activism, quality shareholders can be
white squires—a term dating to the 1980s referring to block
128. See JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN (5th ed. 2014); see also LOUIS ENGEL
& HENRY R. HECHT, HOW TO BUY STOCKS (8th ed. 1994).
129. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (12th ed. 2019).
130. Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund
Industry, 118 J. FIN. ECON. (2015); Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds
in Equilibrium, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 147 (2017); Hyunglae Jeon, Jangkoo Kang & Changjun
Lee, Precision About Manager Skill, Mutual Fund Flows, and Performance Persistence, 40 N. AM.
J. ECON. FIN. 222 (2017).
131. Nicolas Bollen & Jeffrey Busse, Short-term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,
18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569 (2004); Robert Kowoski, Allan Timmermann, Russ Wermers & Hal
White, Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61
J. FIN. 2551 (2006).
132. Yakov Amihud & Ruslan Goyenko, Mutual Fund’s R2 as Predictor of Performance, 26
REV. FIN. STUD. 667 (2013); Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund
Manager? A New Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009).
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shareholders tending to support management.133 When a board
perceives activist excess, it helps to have a few large long-term
owners to consult. As a united front, the company’s hand is
strengthened, resisting excess while addressing legitimate concerns
activists may have.134
Quality shareholders study company specifics which indexers,
being stretched thin, cannot.135 Indexers may be good at analyzing
dynamic issues as they arise, but rarely develop deep knowledge
that quality shareholders command. Indexers invest most of their
limited resources to develop views about what is best generally in
corporate governance, not what is best for particular companies.
Quality shareholders differ from both activists and indexers
regarding director elections. While activists often nominate
directors fellow board members resist, and indexers almost never
nominate directors at all, quality shareholders offer a supply of
outstanding directors for their investees, often themselves.136
Because of their long-term investments, quality shareholders
offset the short-term preferences of transients. A high density of
quality shareholders, with their characteristic patience, helps
managers operate strategically, with a long-term outlook.137 Such
effects can percolate throughout a company. If less pressure comes
from shareholders to produce short-term results, then directors,
officers, employees, suppliers, strategic partners, and others can
operate in the same manner.138

133. See supra note 120.
134. See James Woolery, Rob Leclerc & Richard Fields, The Ashland-Cruiser
Proxy Contest—A Case Study, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/20/the-ashland-cruiser-proxy-contest-acase-study/.
135. See infra Part III for an extended discussion of the related debate.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 267–78; CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS,
supra note 8 at 28–34 (examples from AutoNation, Berkshire Hathaway, Constellation
Software, Credit Acceptance Corporation, Enstar, Fairfax Financial, Teledyne, The
Washington Post Company).
137. See Brian L. Connelly, Laszlo Tihanyi, S. Trevis Certo & Michael A. Hitt, Marching
to the Beat of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions, 53
ACAD. MGMT. J. 723 (2010) (adapting Bushee’s empirical method and classification finding
positive association between high density of quality shareholders and strategic management
decision making).
138. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8 at 28–34 (citing Leucadia
Corporation and Markel Corporation).
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Shareholder cohorts have different preferences about the price
levels of stocks they own. To illustrate briefly:
• transients generally prefer the highest price possible for
maximum profit on immediate sale;
• indexers favor the highest reasonable price because they
assume, consistent with efficient market theory, that price and
value are substantially the same; and
• quality shareholders, who are generally uninterested in an
immediate sale and attuned to stock market volatility, prefer a
stock price that bears the most rational relationship possible to
the company’s intrinsic business value.139

Many managers tend to likewise prefer the highest possible
stock price, perceiving it as a measure of their own performance—
the higher the better.140 But while they often complain that their
company’s stock price is too low, under- and over-pricing are
equally likely and neither is desirable.141
A share price that is rationally related to business value can be
a huge asset for several purposes, including making acquisitions,
compensating employees, and facilitating fairly priced gains (or
losses) when shareholders must sell.142 While there is a lively debate
over the degree of such market efficiency—of how well price
approximates value—companies with the closest nexus enjoy clear
advantages over those with the widest gaps. Evidence suggests that
companies with ownership dominated by quality shareholders
tend to enjoy stock prices that are less volatile and more rationally
related to business value.143
139. See BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS, supra note 17, at 38 (explaining the virtues of a rational
stock price as opposed to an elevated stock price). At purchase, of course, quality
shareholders seek prices below value.
140. See BARUCH LEV, WINNING INVESTORS OVER: SURPRISING TRUTHS ABOUT HONESTY,
EARNINGS GUIDANCE, AND OTHER WAYS TO BOOST YOUR STOCK PRICE 103–05 (2012)
(suggesting that managers care more about underpricing than overpricing).
141. Id. at 105.
142. See BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS, supra note 17, at 38 (Berkshire’s owner-related business
principles, number 14).
143. See BOROCHIN & YANG, supra note 61. Other recent research affirms other
advantages that long-term investors contribute to companies they invest in. Jarrad Harford,
Ambrus Kecskés & Sattar Mansi, Do Long-Term Investors Improve Corporate Decision Making?
(2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2505261. Longstanding
empirical research has generally found that inclusion in an index drives stock price up. See
Prem C. Jain, The Effect on Stock Price of Inclusion in or Exclusion from the S&P 500, 43 FIN.
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With such advantages on offer, amid today’s fragmented
shareholder base, the quality shareholder cohort remains a
valuable force in the investment community and stock markets.
II. TIME HORIZON
For decades, corporate law professors have debated
shareholder time horizons. Critics focus on the short-termism of the
shareholder activist. Defenders dispute the claim that shorttermism is a problem at all, let alone one exemplified by activists.
Amid the academic debate, considerable policy changes
occurred in the broader process of legal and business evolution.
These policy dynamics were so diverse—expanding shareholder
power in some areas while curtailing it in others—that both sides
of the academic debate could cite accomplishments but would also
have to acknowledge setbacks.144
At present, therefore, the academic debate is at something of a
stalemate. This Part reviews the academic theory and debate, along
with the major policy implications, illustrating important effects
of adding quality shareholders on topics such as staggered boards
and splitting versus combining the roles of board chairman
and CEO.
A. Theory and Debate
In traditional economic theory concerning stock market prices
and managerial behavior, short-termism cannot exist.145 For one,
competitive processes optimize any trade-off between short- and

ANALYSTS J. 58, 58–60 (1987). Early evidence showed the increase ranged from 3% to 9%.
Antti Petajisto, The Index Premium and Its Hidden Cost for Index Funds, 18 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 271,
272 (2011); Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579, 584 (1986);
William B. Elliott, Bonnie F. Van Ness, Mark D. Walker & Richard S. Warr, What Drives the
S&P 500 Inclusion Effect? An Analytical Survey, 35 FIN. MGMT. 31, 31 (2006). This occurs as a
result of supply and demand, as indexers buy the stock automatically. This drives price
above value. Moreover, much of the evidence indicated that this price effect was not
temporary. Although the effects may diminish over time and on more prominent indexes,
permanent market distortions remain a factor. See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate
Governance and Index Exclusion, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1229 (2018).
144. See infra text accompanying notes 170–72.
145. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the
Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 1004 (2013).
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long-term values.146 In addition, efficient stock markets rapidly
impound into price all relevant long-run information.147 At a
minimum, current stock price is the best estimate of long-term
corporate value.148 Strategies that will deliver value tomorrow are
manifest in stock price today.
A rival stance in economic theory contends that short-termism
can arise from two sources: market myopia or managerial myopia.
Market myopia occurs when investors fail to price shares correctly
due to informational asymmetry between managers and investors.
For example, managers may fear short-term market punishment for
failure to meet quarterly earnings expectations, and therefore
might forego costly research and development (“R&D”) in order to
maintain current share price.149
Managerial myopia occurs when managers take opportunistic
advantage of information asymmetries favoring them. A manager’s
decision may yield rewards that are optimal for them—without
regard to time horizon—though impair long-term shareholder
value. Examples are permanent boosts to a manager’s reputation or
immediate bonuses from executing projects with inferior long-term
corporate payoffs.150
The law and economics literature on short-termism adds
another source: impatience. Some shareholders have immediate
liquidity needs prompting them to sell.151 The effect is to rivet on
prevailing price rather than longer-term value. Again, under
efficient market theory, this cannot occur, but under this rival

146. See Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND
CORP. FIN. J. 1, 5–6 (1986).
147. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992).
148. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1660–62 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Myth].
149. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Froot, David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd on the
Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation, 47 J. FIN. 1461,
1480–81 (1992); Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 212–13
(1984). See generally Michael J. Brennan, Latent Assets, 45 J. FIN. 709 (1990) (distinguishing
“latent assets” whose values are not reflected in share prices).
150. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, Managerial Incentives and Capital
Management, 101 Q. J. ECON. 835 (1986); Tim S. Campbell & Anthony M. Marino, Myopic
Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 855 (1994).
151. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991).
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theory such behavior can pressure managers to pursue short-term
profits at the expense of long-term investment.152
Since such liquidity effects arise only for impatient investors,
legal scholars wondered whether there are too many of them and
what, if anything, corporate law might do about that. Critics
targeted shareholder activists, especially hedge funds specializing
in that approach. Opponents, while acknowledging some costs,
stressed the gains in accountability and long-run prosperity.153
Shareholders are the best incentivized participants to assure
managerial accountability, after all.154 Many are even better
informed than corporate boards and therefore likely to be effective
in overseeing wayward managers.155 They develop expertise in
governance and strategy to provide superior solutions.
In the ensuing corporate law scholarship debate, contestants
dispute the extent of the empirical evidence on short-termism.
Prominent among the empirical researchers is the work of
Professor Bushee—although not so much embracing his entire
classification scheme as focusing on his related research on the
effects of a high density of transients in a shareholder base.156
In an often-cited work,157 Bushee found that “transient
ownership creates incentives for managers to sacrifice long-term
investment to avoid a decline in current earnings.”158 He profiled
all companies positioned to reverse a year-on-year earnings decline
152. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 75; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance
and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002).
153. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2015); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
154. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395 (1983). FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 73 (1991).
155. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 80, at 897.
156. See Brian Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings Over Long Run
Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 207, 213 (2001) [hereinafter Bushee, Near-Term]; Brian J.
Bushee & Christopher F. Noe, Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional Investors, and Stock
Return Volatility, 38 J. ACCT. RSCH. 171 (2000).
157. Bushee, Myopic R&D, supra note 11, at 330 (this article is cited some 4,000 times
according to Google Scholar (last visited January 15, 2020)); see also Zohar Goshen & Assaf
Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 581 (2016) (citing Brian
J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV.
305 (1998)); David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911,
913–14 (2013).
158. Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 31.
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by reducing R&D spending. Companies with a high density of
transients were significantly more likely to do so than those with
lower transient populations.
Professors Coffee and Palia attest to the significance of
Professor Bushee’s work and the long line of research that has
followed and affirmed it. In their 2016 article on activism, for
example, they introduce the line of scholarship to “strongly
suggest” that shareholder base influences corporate time
horizons.159 The authors note that Bushee’s research dates to 1998,
and highlight two major articles, finding that companies with high
transient density are (1) more prone to earnings management such
as R&D spending cuts and (2) more likely to be valued based on
near-term earnings rather than long-term earnings.160 They
reference further studies affirming the findings and adding that
high transient density weakens shareholder oversight of managers
and adds pressure for near-term earnings over long-term value.161
Other participants in the horizon debate start by citing Bushee’s
work as evidence of short-termism, before moving on to argue
broader normative implications. For instance, Professor Dallas
challenges the shareholder value maximization norm because, per
Bushee, short-term shareholders pressure managers for short term
results with related evidence of earnings management.162 For
another, Professor Millon, who elaborates on Bushee’s shareholder
classification scheme more fully, finds compelling evidence

159. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 573–74 (2016).
160. Id. at 574 nn.109 & 111 (citing, respectively, Bushee, Myopic R&D, supra note 11, at
330; Bushee, Near-Term, supra note 156, at 213).
161. Coffee & Palia, supra note 159, at 574 nn.111–13 (citing numerous articles,
including Kevin J. Laverty, Economic “Short-Termism”: The Debate, the Unresolved Issues, and
the Implications for Management Practice and Research, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 825 (1996); Xia
Chen, Jarrad Harford & Kai Li, Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 279
(2007); Jose-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Shareholder Investment Horizons
and the Market for Corporate Control, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 135 (2005); François Derrien, Ambrus
Kecskés & David Thesmar, Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 1755 (2013); Katherine Guthrie & Jan Sokolowsky, Large Shareholders and the
Pressure to Manage Earnings, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 302 (2010)).
162. Lynne L. Dallas, Is There Hope for Change: The Evolution of Conceptions of “Good”
Corporate Governance, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491, 538 (2017) (citing Bushee, Myopic R&D,
supra note 11, at 307); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 702–03.
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of short-termism to demand that corporations take greater
social responsibility.163
On the other side of the debate, many corporate law scholars
find evidence of short-termism too limited to warrant substantial
legal or policy changes. Professor Fried, for one, says “only a few”
studies have found significant short-termism.164 Professors
Bebchuk, Dent, and Roe all separately arrived at similar
conclusions.165 Despite that point, Fried says there is no question
that short-term shareholder interests “are not perfectly aligned
with [profit] maximization.”166
If the empirical evidence is mixed,167 so are the realities: even if
some activists have short-term bias, they need support of a large
bloc of other shareholders to influence corporate policy.168
Importantly, that group would be comprised of a diverse group of
shareholders, including transients, indexers, and quality
shareholders. Yet the literature in this debate tends to group all
such
others
under
the
broad
umbrella
of
169
“institutional investors.”
Amid such disagreement on the facts as to short-termism,
corporate law scholars have joined debate over the legal stakes. All
participants agree that these are vast. At the most general level,
they pose the hoary corporate law question of allocation of power
between directors and officers on the one hand and shareholders

163. David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 914
(2013) (“[T]here is broad agreement that short-termism is widespread in the current
investment landscape.”).
164. Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J.
1554, 1582 (2015) (citing Bushee, Myopic R&D, supra note 11 and Natasha Burns, Simi Kedia
& Marc Lipson, Institutional Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence from Financial Misreporting,
16 J. CORP. FIN. 443, 444 (2010) (finding association between transient density and probability
and severity of restated financial reports)).
165. Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 148, at 1643–44 (little evidence that short-term
holder influence undermines long-term value creation); George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential
Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 149–50
(2010) (very little evidence of short-termism); Roe, supra note 145, at 1004 (insufficient
evidence to warrant changes in corporate law).
166. Fried, supra note 164, at 1583.
167. See also Tucker, supra note 37; Cremers & Sepe, Institutional Investors, supra note 38;
supra text accompanying notes 37–38.
168. See Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson & Alessio M. Pacces, The Case for An Unbiased
Takeover Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 85, 96 n.36 (2014).
169. E.g., id.
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on the other.170 Those who see short-termism as a serious problem
look to weaken shareholder power and strengthen managerial
power; opponents, viewing short-termism as at best an annoyance,
worry about insulating managers from accountability.171
In play are all aspects of corporate governance, from proxy
access and poison pills to voting rules. During the course of the
horizon debate, proponents of shareholder empowerment won
many victories, but so too did their opponents.172 Still up in the air
are a variety of debated governance devices, such as staggered
boards, chairman/CEO roles, and shareholder voting—all of which
are considered later in this Article. These unresolved debates reflect
how, to a significant degree, the horizon debate has reached
a stalemate, as the next Section shows. Adding quality shareholders
to the discussion could help unlock them, as the ensuing
Section illustrates.
B. Status and Direction
For a snapshot of the current state of the horizon debate,
consider the content of a major 2018 symposium on the subject,
which Professor Tucker hosted.173 It featured a dozen rich and
original pieces, all making fascinating contributions and drawing
attention to the relative virtues and differences in time horizon.
Indeed, a few delineated time horizon more finely or sought to
rephrase the horizon issue as whether a given time horizon accords
with related risk assumed.174 Some prescribed sweeping systemic
steps to counteract short-termism for social benefit through such
170. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010).
171. See sources cited supra note 2.
172. See Cremers & Sepe, Institutional Investors, supra note 38, at 397 n.37 (delineating a
variety of pro-shareholder victories arising from this debate, including: shareholder
activism, emergence of proxy advisory firms, majority voting and withhold campaigns,
growing use and success of shareholder proposals, amendments to proxy filing requirements
facilitating use of shareholder proposals, amendments to the Delaware corporate law statute
favoring proxy access, say-on-pay shareholder votes, and expansion of the scope of
shareholder proposals to effect changes in corporate election procedures).
173. See Anne Tucker, 20/20 Vision in the Long & Short-Termism Debate, 41 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 337 (2018) [hereinafter Tucker, 20/20 Vision].
174. E.g., Jim Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking the Right
Questions: Modern Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 449, 449 (2018);
Frank Partnoy, Specificity and Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525 (2018);
Andrew Verstein, Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, and the Liability Structure of Investor Time
Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577 (2018).
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innovations as federal savings accounts or universal equity
funds175 or at the very least designing executive pay to reward
long-term performance.176
In a more skeptical contribution to the symposium, Professor
de Fontenay detected a tendency of debaters to imagine an ideal
shareholder to measure others against.177 In the literature, the ideal
is vaguely reported as a “long-term” and “active monitor” but
without much detail, de Fontenay said, and for good reason, she
adds: there is no such ideal.178 Rather, given both the diversity of
shareholders and the dynamic rate of change in capital markets,
lawyerly interventions to promote or retard particular shareholder
types are doomed, she argued.179
De Fontenay may be right, and the evidence in the horizon
debate is mixed enough to warrant caution. But the literature’s
nearly exclusive emphasis on horizon obscures the element of
relative concentration, whose inclusion might alter the case about
whether there is such an ideal. At minimum, further delineation
of shareholder types based on conviction would help move the
debate forward.
Two empirical pieces in the symposium made such headway
towards a more complete picture. In one, Professors Sampson and
Shi drew upon Bushee’s classification, finding evidence that
transients have a greater presence and quality shareholders
(dedicated) a lesser presence over the period from 1980 to 2013.180
These observations took into account both time and conviction.
While valuably delineating shareholder types, these scholars
examined the implications for national economic performance
rather than for corporate governance.
In their contribution to the symposium, Professors Cremers and
Sepe explicitly added relative shareholder concentration to relative
time horizons. They explained that accounts in the legal literature
175. William A. Birdthistle, Federalism of Personal Finance: State and Federal Retirement
Plans, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 367 (2018); Lynn Stout & Sergio Gramitto, Corporate Governance
as Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 551 (2018).
176. Caroline Flammer, Long-Term Executive Compensation as a Remedy for Corporate
Short-Termism, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 419, 420 (2018).
177. See generally de Fontenay, supra note 12.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Rachelle Sampson & Yuan Shi, Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, 41 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 543 (2018).
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tend to present investors in “dichotomic” terms, as always shortterm or always long-term, while the truth is more complex,
requiring “a more exact taxonomy of institutional investor behavior
along the two crucial dimensions of institutional investors’
investment horizons and activism.”181 They concluded by
mediating the horizon debate’s “polarized rendering” in favor
of capturing “nuances that depend on a variety of factors” that
the “law and economics literature has paid relatively little
attention to.”182
This is a promising advance, although subtle and limited. It is
so subtle, for instance, that the innovation was not among those
highlighted in the editor’s overview of the symposium.183 It is
limited in that the study used conviction (“active share”) as a proxy
for activism.184 Active share is usually about investment
concentration, however, not inclination or style of engagement.185
It can be a partial proxy for activism, but concentration is a defining
trait of quality (dedicated) shareholders. A next step in the research
would tease out, within the data, those shareholders with high
concentrations as well as long holding periods. That would be the
quality shareholder cohort.186 A few of the many implications of
doing so are reviewed next.187

181. Cremers & Sepe, Institutional Investors, supra note 38, at 389.
182. Id. at 392, 398–99.
183. Tucker, 20/20 Vision, supra note 173, at 337.
184. Cremers & Sepe, Institutional Investors, supra note 38, at 405.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 57–62.
186. I confirmed my interpretation via email with Professor Sepe (Jan. 20, 2020).
187. Boston University Law Review published a symposium in 2019 with twenty-two
articles—spanning some 600 pages—under the heading “Institutional Investor Activism.”
Important and broad ranging, several pieces focused on aspects of the horizon debate as well
as the conviction debate. None, however, discussed combining the two behaviors.
On horizon debate: Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Anti-Activist Poison Pills, 99 B.U. L.
REV. 915 (2019); Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U.
L. REV. 971 (2019).
On conviction debate: Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three,
99 B.U. L. REV. 721 (2019); Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion,
99 B.U. L. REV. 1229 (2019).
On voting: David H. Webber, Reforming Pensions While Retaining Shareholder Voice,
99 B.U. L. REV. 1001 (2019); Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting
in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151 (2019).
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C. Policy Implications
Adding discussion of quality shareholders to the horizon
debate would enable distinguishing not merely short- versus longterm but long-term with or without concentration. To illustrate
how the addition would illuminate specific corporate law debates,
consider two controversial governance features: staggered boards,
and splitting versus combining the roles of board chairman
and CEO.
First, a long-standing sub-debate in corporate law considers the
superiority of unitary versus staggered boards. With unitary
boards, all seats are filled in annual elections; with staggered
boards, each director serves a term of two or three years.188
Proponents of staggered boards stress advantages such as
continuity and institutional knowledge while critics cite insulation
from accountability.
Corporate law scholars, as well as major indexers, challenge
staggered boards as excessively pro-management. Professor
Bebchuk has been an outspoken opponent of staggered boards.189
Students at his law school mounted national campaigns to destagger boardrooms across corporate America.190 He and his
colleagues marshalled impressive research data to contend that
staggered boards reduced firm value.
In the other corner of this contentious debate stood Professor
Cremers and his colleagues, who put forth equally intense
counterarguments and opposing data sets showing that staggered
boards increased firm value. This camp of scholars, which included
some judges and prominent lawyers,191 argued for staggered
boards as either a default rule or as a requirement.192

188. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2020).
189. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
ECON. 409 (2005).
190. See Course Catalogue: Shareholder Rights Project, HARV. L. SCH.,
https://hls.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/index.html?o=64841.
191. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate:
A Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2002) (judges
proposing three-year terms); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 225–30
(1991) (prominent corporate lawyers proposing five-year terms).
192. See generally K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of
Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 77–81 (2016) (exploring the benefits of staggered boards).
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Recent scholarship challenges the reliability of both empirical
sides of the argument, contending instead that neither is right:
whether a staggered board is good or bad depends on the
company.193 The attempt to settle this debate is another way of
recasting the horizon debate in more holistic terms. In some of the
empirical work—and in much of the rhetoric, described as
“polemical”194—the board structure sub-debate was a microcosm of
the horizon debate: proponents of staggered boards urged longterm value against short-term interests while opponents of
staggered boards denied that they had a short-term focus.
In attempting to settle the debate, Amihud, Schmid, and
Solomon pointed to research myopia in the data.195 It riveted too
narrowly on horizon issues to the exclusion of many other factors
that bear on firm value. And firm value, recall, is something beheld
differently by the wide variety of shareholder types.196
Moreover, Cremers and Sepe disagree that the debate is
settled.197 But they are also moving helpfully forward to focus on
shareholder time horizon as well as conviction. For example, in
their recent symposium article, they found that a higher density of
quality shareholders reduces, though only slightly, the value of
staggered boards.198 They say this might reflect that activists apply
short-term pressure.
But another explanation is that quality shareholders do not take
a blanket approach to staggered boards. The evidence suggests that
quality shareholders may slightly favor companies with unitary
boards, but companies with staggered boards nevertheless attract

193. Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered
Board Debate, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1475, 1475 (2018).
194. Id. at 1477.
195. Id. at 1475.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 139–40 (quality shareholders focus on business
value, seeking to purchase at a discount, and otherwise seek rational pricing; indexers
assume market efficiency; and transients prefer the highest price possible).
197. K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe & Saura Masconale, Is the Staggered Board
Debate Really Settled?, 167 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 9 passim (2019).
198. Cremers & Sepe, Institutional Investors, supra note 38, at 416.
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sizable quality shareholder cohorts.199 Companies certainly
continue to be divided on the right approach.200
The scholarly attempt to settle the board structure sub-debate is
consistent with the views of quality shareholders on such issues:
context matters, and different companies need different
governance features. While on its face such an assertion seems
obvious to make and easy to defend, many scholars and most
indexers—but not quality shareholders—have assumed that
staggered boards are always good or bad. Adding quality
shareholders to the debate challenges that assumption.
Second, consider ongoing debate over whether to split or
combine the roles of chairman of the board and CEO. Traditionally,
the CEO held the board chairman role as well. But in recent years,
critics have challenged such a practice. Their theory is that boards
elect and oversee the CEO, so having one person wear both hats
creates a conflict. Yet that is only one vote on boards with many
independent directors, so any conflict can easily be neutralized.
Many corporations thrive when led by an outstanding person
serving as both chairman and chief executive, just as others have
failed when the roles are split.201 Companies are about evenly
divided on the practice: about half the S&P 500 split the functions
while the other half combine them.202 For their part, quality
shareholders appear to think about this case-by-case and, if
anything, slightly favor companies that combine rather than split
the functions.203
Finally, consider a case study that illuminates the importance of
both horizon and conviction. Professors Riel and Martin of the
University of Toronto profiled the example of Unilever. In 2009,
hoary old Unilever’s share turnover mapped that of other
multinationals, plagued by a large portion of shareholders with

199. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 132 (within the S&P
500, sixty-one have staggered boards, of which 14% are in the top 10% of quality shareholder
density versus those with unitary boards where 37% are in the top 10%).
200. See Bebchuk, supra note 2 (indicating that about half the Russell 3000 companies
have staggered boards).
201. To give a dramatic case, the chairman and CEO roles were split at Enron Corporation.
202. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 132 (within the S&P
500, 229 split and 245 combine).
203. Id. at 132 (of those splitting, 16% are in the top 10% in terms of quality shareholder
density, and of those combining, 28% are in the top 10%).

41

1.CUNNINGHAM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/9/2021 8:56 PM

46:1 (2020)

holding periods of less than one year.204 To CEO Paul Polman, the
high level of transients translated into urgent demands for
maximizing quarterly profits and daily share prices.
Such a capital markets outlook adversely affected operations,
strategy, and reporting. Unilever published quarterly earnings
guidance, forming expectations among market watchers. Then, to
meet these expectations, division managers cut spending on R&D,
information technology, and capital projects.
Polman recognized this flawed strategy. He adopted new
policies and clearly communicated these to shareholders and the
market. Unilever would cease quarterly guidance and reporting. It
would no longer seek to deliver maximum profits each quarter or
year but would seek consistent and sustained profits across
multiple years. At first, the stock price dropped.
But within two years, it recovered and continued to rise over
the next eight years in tandem with sustained profits. In the
process, transient shareholders were chased away, replaced by a
concentration of long-term holders. As of late 2017, not long before
Polman retired, Unilever’s largest fifty owners boasted an average
holding period of seven years.
Many of these were quality shareholders, but a substantial
cohort of indexers were among them.205 In other words, Polman’s
campaign was only half successful.
In 2018, after Unilever announced plans to move to an
Amsterdam-only listing rather than maintain its long-standing
dual listing in London, indexers howled. They wanted Unilever to
retain its London listing so that it would remain in their favored
index. Unilever succumbed to their pressure.
While doing so was consistent with seeking long-term
shareholders, the move compromised the other goal of attracting
concentrated shareholders—those with conviction. Putting horizon
and conviction together is important in practice as well as in theory.

204. See Jennifer Riel & Roger Martin, How Unilever Won Over Shareholders with Its LongTerm Approach, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/reporton-business/careers/management/how-unilever-won-over-shareholders-with-its-longterm-approach/article36538572/.
205. Among quality shareholders, Unilever has attracted AKO Capital, Gardner
Russo Gardner, and Hotchkiss & Wiley. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS,
supra note 8, at 123.
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III. PORTFOLIO CONVICTION
Corporate law professors have begun to wade into their version
of the hottest debate in finance: passive versus active investing. As
referenced at the end of Part I, the debate in finance concerns the
relative performance of these two broad approaches to investing.206
In corporate law, the debate concerns the relative incentives and
capacities of shareholders in these two broad categories to cast
informed votes on corporate matters. All participants in both
debates face a huge challenge: the two categories are not selfdefining, and the available tools to distinguish between the
categories are limited.
Passive usually refers to an investing strategy that buys all
stocks in an index, without requiring active decision making
concerning which stocks to buy or sell, whereas active denotes
everything else. “Everything else” is a huge diverse category,
however, encompassing countless alternative investment strategies
and styles—value, growth, momentum, chartist, quantitative.
Finance researchers deal with this problem by exploring, within
“everything else,” any strategies or styles that an investor could use
systematically to outperform the market indexes. While that
delineation helps researchers to canvass more comprehensively, it
may often exclude distinctive strategies of quality shareholders
who do not compare performance with annual benchmarks.207
In the nascent legal literature, moreover, the focus to date has
been on the indexers, especially the largest ones, and their
incentives and capacities, rather than on exploring the various
alternative types and their incentives and capacities. For instance, a
wave of current scholarship focuses intensively on the incentives
and capabilities of the three largest indexers, contrasting those few
firms with everything else dubbed “active.”208
While useful to gain insight into the major indexers, such a
focus obscures the contributions of rivals and muddies the meaning
of any related policy implications. In particular, there is as big a
difference between an “active” fund that is long- or short-term as
between an active fund that is heavily concentrated (1 to 20 stocks),
moderately concentrated (20 to 50), or somewhat diversified (up to
206. See supra text accompanying notes 122–32.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 106–09.
208. See sources cited supra note 3.
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100). While delineating every cohort for purposes of legal analysis
may be more daunting than hunting for market-beating results in
finance, it is relatively easy and highly illuminating to add the
quality shareholder. This Part explores how to do so by
incorporating perspectives on the quality shareholder into the
principal terms of evolving debate in corporate law scholarship
about index funds.
A. Theory and Debate
The business model of the large index funds is to develop a
broad portfolio of securities, minimize costs, and match the index.
Compensation is based on size of the fund rather than performance
of the fund, the traditional approach in the investment
management industry. Accordingly, indexers strive to increase
assets under management (AUM). Beyond that description,
corporate law scholars begin to disagree.
The disagreement starts with theory. Recall references to the
course of corporate life during the twentieth century.209 The
challenge of corporate life was bridging the separation of
ownership from control, and the job of corporate law was to
mitigate the agency costs that arise when strong managers control
companies with weak owners. The rise of institutional investors
heralded a new era where such agency costs would be vastly
reduced. But experience has disappointed such hopes as
institutional investors, holding funds for others, bring agency costs
of their own.
Today’s scholarly disagreement concerns the magnitude of
those costs and what corporate law might do about it. Two main
rival theories contend in portraying the index fund sector. One
account is the value maximization view. In this account, agency
costs are real but modest, as funds have requisite incentives to act
on behalf of their investors to monitor investments to assure the
best outcomes for their investors. The rival view sees agency costs
as large and forbidding, where fund managers face offsetting
personal incentives and lack economic incentives to invest in
stewardship to improve the performance of particular companies.
Both theories have a certain appeal. Both sides can point to
evidence to support their theories. All positions could be improved,
209. See supra text accompanying notes 27–34.
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however, by adding the perspective of quality shareholders. The
following Sections review some leading theoretical positions on
incentives of the largest indexers, and related evidence, while
adding the perspective of the quality shareholder.
1. Incentives
In a recent book-length article, Professors Bebchuk and Hirst
make the case for an agency cost theory of indexing among the
largest such funds.210 To start, they identify several benefits that
index fund managers may obtain from solicitude toward investee
managers compared to what their investors would prefer. These
include business relationships, avoiding triggering regulatory
duties that can arise from taking an adversarial stance such as
securities disclosures, and minimizing the risk of regulatory
backlash by overplaying their hand against corporate America.
In another long article, Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and
Davidoff Solomon counter that such incentives may be neutralized
by fiduciary standards and moral norms.211 For their part,
Professors Kahan and Rock add a reputational argument.212 They
cite the public relations campaigns mounted by leading industry
figures, such as the letters directed to chief executives by BlackRock
CEO Laurence Fink.
Norms and reputational concerns may constrain behavior, but
probably imperfectly and no more than among other shareholder
types. For instance, while the largest index funds and their CEOs
may have name recognition, that is not true of those who manage
funds. In contrast, quality shareholders often put their names on
the door, write books, issue newsletters, and speak at
conferences.213 They become well known, showing substantial
investment in reputation. Quality shareholders form exclusive

210. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 3 (120,000 words).
211. Fisch et al., The New Titans, supra note 3 (60,000 words).
212. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders (N.Y.U. Sch. L., Law & Economics Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 18-39, 2019) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be].
213. Individual examples: Chuck Akre at Akre Capital Management; Shelby and Chris
Davis at Davis Selected Advisers; Ingrid Hendershot at Hendershot Investments; Tom Russo
at Gardner Russo Gardner; Sir John Templeton at Templeton Funds; and Thomas Rowe Price
at T. Rowe Price & Co. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, Appendix.

45

1.CUNNINGHAM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/9/2021 8:56 PM

46:1 (2020)

membership fraternities and even offer an examination-based
certification that is regarded as the toughest in the industry.214
On the other side of this debate, presenting the value
maximization theory of the largest indexers, stand Professors
Kahan and Rock.215 In an intricate draft article, they offer an account
of the direct incentives that index fund families have to increase the
market capitalization of investees: doing so increases AUM. To
Kahan and Rock, incentives are measured by the increased fees that
follow from increases in AUM. They conclude, “[T]he most
important factor by far in determining how much a fund adviser
stands to gain from being informed is the size of the holdings.”216
On that basis, they say the largest indexers—those with trillions in
AUM—have the greatest incentives.
Bebchuck and Hirst respond to Kahan and Rock’s AUM thesis
by focusing on individual index fund managers.217 Their
compensation is based on a tiny percentage of a fund’s AUM,
so increasing the value of a particular investee yields little gain
for them.
Two more fundamental problems face the AUM thesis from a
quality shareholder perspective. First, quality shareholders do not
measure themselves by the growth in size of their investees but by
their return on shareholders’ equity over long periods of time.218
Those may often increase by virtue of a company shrinking in size,
as through dividends, buybacks, or spinoffs—not growing market
capitalization.219 Growth in AUM due to growth in investee market
214. See Julia LaRoche, 11 Horror Stories About the Killer Exam that Wall Streeters Will Be
Taking This Saturday, BUS. INSIDER (May 30, 2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/cfahorror-stories-2013-5 (CFA exam); Daren Fonda, Even Wall Street Pros Have a Tough Time Getting
Into This Club, BARRON’S (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/even-wall-streetpros-have-a-tough-time-getting-into-this-club-1535143468 (Value Investors’ Club).
215. Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be, supra note 212.
216. Id.
217. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 3.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 106–09.
219. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8. For instance, The
Washington Post Co. in 2015 spun off its Cable One subsidiary, renaming the remaining
company Graham Holdings. Cable One began trading at around $400 per share and today is
worth $1,500. Indexers focused on Graham as a factor in AUM might have balked at this
extraordinarily valuable transaction. But capital allocation is a vital topic dear to quality
shareholders so often myopically ignored in this way by indexers and their supporters alike.
See generally WILLIAM N. THORNDIKE, THE OUTSIDERS: EIGHT UNCONVENTIONAL CEOS AND
THEIR RADICALLY RATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR SUCCESS (2012) (discussing CEOs who excelled
at using astute capital allocation to increase their companies’ per-share value).
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capitalization does not capture this source of incentives.
The absence of such a baseline prevents a comparative assessment
of the incentives of the major indexers.
Second, Kahan and Rock’s AUM model lacks attention to the
important variables included in the research of Bushee and
others.220 These are the variables that delineate the quality
shareholder cohort and define its incentives. In Bushee’s model, for
example, they are average percentage ownership of investees, the
percentage of investees representing at least a 5% share of the
portfolio, and the average size of each investment.221 The incentives
that arise from having such high stakes in a company likely dwarf
those of large indexers with relatively small stakes in thousands of
companies. Again, in any event, the AUM incentives model fails to
offer a way to compare the incentives of quality shareholders.
Professor Fisch and her co-authors offer a different account of
indexes’ incentives to support their theory of indexer value
maximization.222 They think that indexers compete with other
indexers as well as with “active” funds.223 They say this competition
gives indexers incentives to improve investee corporate
governance because such improvements remove the advantages
of stock picking. In other words, indexers try to outperform
“active” rivals.
Bebchuk and Hirst doubt this creates indexer incentives to
invest in stewardship.224 They explain that people migrate from
“active” to passive investing because of the observed difficulty of
funds beating market averages. Under this motivation, indexers
compete for customers not with active funds but with fellow
indexers. True, “active” funds still manage substantial assets,
because some do beat their index benchmark, Bebchuk and Hirst
theorize. That will remain so even if indexer stewardship increases
Companies may grow merely by retaining and deploying earnings in suboptimal projects,
which may help a fund grow its AUM but not drive higher corporate returns to shareholders.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58.
221. See supra text accompanying note 57.
222. Fisch et al., The New Titans, supra note 3.
223. Throughout the corporate law literature on the conviction debate, writers
routinely juxtapose passive indexers with “active” investors without distinguishing among
activists, transients, quality, or other distinctive categories. When examples appear in this
discussion, the word “active” is placed in quotation marks.
224. Despite their equally sympathetic view of large indexers, Kahan and Rock also
reject Fisch’s indirect incentives theory. Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be, supra note 212.
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investee value. In fact, active investors with concentrated
ownership in given companies benefit more from indexer efforts
targeted to improve such companies, hardly creating indexer
incentives to intervene.
Both Fisch’s thesis and the Bebchuk-Hirst response suffer from
the same problems as Kahan and Rock’s AUM thesis: quality
shareholders do not measure their performance against annual
index performance. Their incentives are entirely different, so such
a theory of indexer incentives is inapposite.
Kahan and Rock add another perspective on the incentives
debate—one that inadvertently touches on quality shareholders.
While agreeing with Bebchuk and Hirst that indexers lack
incentives to compete with “active” funds for new business
(“inflows”), they say concentrated fund managers may have such
incentives. Drawing on the finance literature,225 they estimate that
competitive funds may increase AUM via inflows by 1.3% for every
point by which they beat a benchmark index. At certain investment
concentration levels, incentives to boost inflows are stronger than
those to increase AUM through investee growth alone, they say.
They instance a fund concentrating 3.5% of its portfolio in a
single stock. That is the average level among smaller funds, with
AUM around $1.2 billion. For that cohort, inflow-based incentives
are 20% larger. On the other hand, they contrast a fund
concentrating merely .5% in a single stock—the average level for
larger funds, with AUM around $736 billion. The difference
disappears. Overall, Kahan and Rock conclude, the inflow-based
incentives of this cohort are slight—low for the smaller firms and
scant for the larger ones.226
But if you change the flawed assumption of AUM growth as an
incentive for quality shareholders and make some adjustments that
are relevant to them, this approach offers some promise.
For example, consider medium-size quality shareholders—say
with $25–50 billion in AUM—and concentrated holdings in some
companies of 5% to 10%. Even within the AUM-based model,
that could spell substantial inflow-based incentives. If also
taking account of the actual incentives of quality shareholders—

225. Id. at 24 (citing Jonathan Lewellen & Katharina Lewellen, Institutional Investors and
Corporate Governance: The Incentives to be Engaged 12 (Working Paper, 2018)).
226. Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be, supra note 212, at 25.
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long-term returns on investment and strong reputations among
constituents—their incentives could swamp those of the
large indexers.227
Being explicit about the quality shareholder cohort, and its
particular incentives that indexers lack, would improve the
theoretical debate over the relative incentives of indexers and
others to operate as informed shareholders. After all, many skeptics
continue to doubt the rationality of an indexer incurring costs of x
to increase investee value knowing they would share most of any
gain with rivals and net a tiny fraction of x.228 Kahan and Rock
counter that the largest three indexers have stronger incentives
than “most” other institutional investors and all but the largest
individuals.229 Quality shareholders are certainly within the
referenced population boasting stronger incentives.
2. Capacity
Debate over indexer incentives leads directly to questions about
their capacity for informed shareholder conduct. While this aspect
of the debate can be measured to some degree, scholars view the
same facts differently.
Participants agree that large indexers cast votes at more than
4,000 annual meetings, adding up to more than 30,000 proposals.
Champions such as Kahan and Rock stress that most do not matter,
and only a few dozen annually are important.230 They then ask if
indexers have the demonstrated capacity to handle those and the
question answers itself: no.231
Fisch and her co-authors stress that the large volume of
meetings and proposals endows large indexers with substantial
economies of scope—each vote produces knowledge useful in other
votes.232 Critics counter that across so many votes, little study can
possibly be made, so little knowledge can possibly accrue.233

227. See supra text accompanying notes 106–09.
228. Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be, supra note 212, at 12 n.44.
229. Id. (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 32–33.
231. Id. at Section II.E (calling these Type C votes).
232. See Fisch et al., The New Titans, supra note 3, at 40.
233. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 3 (detailing the stewardship resources of
Blackrock, Vanguard, and SSGA)
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Fisch embraces the widely publicized commitment these funds
made to increase their stewardship staffs.234 But Bebchuk and Hirst
find the results underwhelming.235 They compare staff size—after
the vaunted increases—in relation to the number and size of
companies to be followed. Among the largest indexers, BlackRock
doubled its stewardship staff to forty-five, Vanguard has twentyone people, and State Street has twelve.236 Yet these indexers have
holdings in more than 11,000 companies each worldwide, and at
least 3,000 in the United States alone.
In dollar terms, total stewardship investment by these big
indexers is a miniscule fraction of their budgets: about $13.5
million, $6.3 million, and $3.6 million, respectively, all less than
one-fifth of 1%—only 0.2%—of total fees and expenses. Even if the
staff focused only on the largest companies—say where their stakes
exceed $1 billion—that still includes hundreds of companies. They
could only devote two to four person-days per year studying that
small portion of their total portfolio.
The following table starkly presents the picture:
Indexers’ Limited Stewardship Stakes237
BlackRock
Vanguard
Stewardship Staff
45
21
Investees Worldwide
11,246
13,225
Investees U.S.
3,765
3,672
Maximum Person Day
<4
<2
Stewardship Expense
$13.5M
$6.3M
Total Fees & Expenses
$9.1B
$3.5B

SSGA
12
12,191
3,117
<2
$3.6M
$2.6B

For context, consider the head count at two other companies
involved in investment analysis. Moody’s, the bond rating agency
covering a large swath of capital markets, employs 12,000 people.
Among the largest quality shareholders, Capital Research, which
keeps up with a far smaller portfolio of companies, employs 7,500.
234. Fisch et al., The New Titans, supra note 3, at 48–49 (quoting materials of the large
indexers, such as BlackRock and Vanguard).
235. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 3, at 2076–116.
236. Id. at 2077.
237. See id. at 2077 (compiling data from Morningstar).
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Bebchuk and Hirst find it hard to believe that the limited
resources of the large indexers suffice to yield informed opinions
on the tens of thousands of shareholder decisions required of an
owner of shares in many thousands of companies. Even if Kahan
and Rock are right that most are quotidian and few grave, Bebchuk
and Hirst say at least a significant portion would require some
knowledge that would entail reading the annual report and proxy
statement, determining the company’s strategic plan and past
performance, understanding components of its executive
compensation plans, and evaluating pending shareholder and
management proposals. Yet the evidence indicates that the big
indexers access only 29% of governance-related public filings of
their investees.238
Fisch and her colleagues stress the extensive private
engagement the large indexers say they routinely undertake.239
Bebchuk and Hirst probe the data to find the probabilities and
public record pointing to inherent limitations. From 2017 through
2019, the largest indexers reported having multiple annual
engagements with only a handful of their investees—3.9% at
Blackrock, 2.3% at Vanguard, and 0.6% at State Street; they had just
one engagement with another 7.2%, 3.5%, and 5.0%, respectively.240
In other words, over a recent three-year period, these firms had no
engagement with the overwhelming majority of the companies
they invest in, contrary to their public assertions that some scholars
have cited. That is not surprising given that they invest in
thousands of companies, and there is little doubt that some of those
investees warrant engagement; in contrast, investors who invest in
ten to twenty companies can readily engage whenever
circumstances warrant.
The implication of the current debate may be that indexer critics
would prefer the rest of the investment community—the group so
often dubbed “active” without delineation—to seize power in the
shareholder voting arena. But at least for Bebchuk and Hirst, that is
not the case. They see high agency costs across the investment

238. Peter Iliev, Jonathan Kalodimos & Michelle Lowry, Investors’ Attention to Corporate
Governance 3 (Mar. 6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3162407.
239. Fisch et al., The New Titans, supra note 3, at 48.
240. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 3, at 2087.
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community.241 The upshot of the indexer critique for them is to create
incentives to induce indexers to engage more and become more
active. But there is more to the debate, concerning the indexers’
favored approach of using formulaic guidelines to cast votes and
how different that is from the quality shareholder approach.
B. Guideline Best Practices
All the major indexes, as well as two leading specialist
companies that advise the rest of the institutional investor market
on shareholder voting, publish guidelines on their views of
corporate best practices. Rather than examining each vote in the
context of a particular company, these guidelines promote certain
precepts for all companies: splitting the roles of board chairman
and CEO, annual rather than staggered terms for directors, and
simple majority shareholder voting. Scholars have different views
on what this approach says about the indexers.
Critics say it reflects the thin staffing that would prevent firms
from reaching an informed opinion for each particular company.
Just as the large indexers are stretched thin, so too are the two
main proxy advisers—Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) and
Glass Lewis. Both operate with lean staffs on low budgets, with just
1,000 employees at ISS and 1,200 at Glass Lewis. Yet they address
a huge market: ISS boasts 1,700 institutional clients while
Glass Lewis’s clients together manage $35 trillion in assets.242
Their small crews opine on hundreds of thousands of separate
decisions annually—ISS addresses 40,000 annual meetings and
Glass Lewis addresses 20,000.243

241. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89 (2017) (distinguishing somewhat between passive
indexers and “active” funds then sharply contrasting activists, but never addressing the
quality shareholder cohort of long-term concentrated shareholders).
242. James R. Copland, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, The Big Thumb on the Scale: An
Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry 1, 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stan. U. Closer
Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corp. Governance No. CGRP-72; Stan. U.
Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 18-27, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188174.
243. The 12,000-person workforce at Moody’s, conducting comparable coverage in
scope, is ten to twelve times these; the Capital Group team of 7,500, covering a fraction of the
scope, is four to seven times as large. Id. at 7.
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In contrast, proponents of indexers treat the guideline approach
as an efficient demonstration of economies of scope.244 Kahan and
Rock theorize that the indexers have a special advantage
concerning broad market-wide issues to which the guidelines
speak, such as the relative appeal of staggered boards.245 They
acknowledge, however, that other investors may have an
advantage when it comes to firm-specific issues such as a given
director’s fit for a particular board. Of course, few issues are purely
firm-specific (a specific question about one company may almost
always be presented by at least some others) or purely issuespecific (general policy on staggered boards might still vary for
different companies), but they think the degree of importance
varies and can be delineated.246
One concern with the guideline method, however, is it
condones a once-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance.
While Kahan and Rock deny holding any such view,247 others come
closer to countenancing it. For example, Fisch and her colleagues
say indexers compete by “engag[ing] in broad-based efforts to
improve the overall performance of the market, . . . address[ing] crosscutting issues such as corporate governance, risk management,
sustainability, and cybersecurity.”248 That is notable for its
suggestion that, rather than trying to maximize the prosperity of
244. Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be, supra note 212, at 35. Kahan and Rock make this
point favoring quality shareholders on certain issues: “Fund families weighted towards
active strategies with more concentrated portfolios will tend to have relatively stronger
incentives to develop company-specific information.” Id. Perhaps—but here’s a place where
adding long-term would help—quality shareholders yes, transients not so much.
245. Consider, on the other hand, the contentious debate on staggered boards described
earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 189–98.
246. Characteristic of the literature in this debate, supra text accompanying notes 207–
08, Kahan and Rock theorize that indexers have an advantage on broad issues while “active”
funds benefit most from company-specific votes—without distinguishing between transient
and quality. Similarly, they say index funds “tend to hold stock over longer periods of time
than actively-managed funds.” Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be, supra note 212, at 36. This
is true of transients but not of quality shareholders.
247. Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be, supra note 212, at 34. “We do not mean to say
that a staggered board is necessarily good or bad for all companies, just that it is likely to be
good or bad for certain types of companies, and thus that the only relevant company-specific
information is what type of company it is.” Id. at 34 n.100. They add that the distinction “is
highly relevant in determining incentives to become informed. While incentives to obtain
company-specific information derive primarily from one’s holdings in a single company,
incentives to obtain issue-specific information derive from one’s holdings in all companies
where a vote on the issue has to be cast.” Id. at 34.
248. Fisch et al., The New Titans, supra note 3, at 25 (emphasis added).
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each given company in the index, indexers seek to get the highest
market return.
In developing their theory of the value indexers add to
corporate governance, Fisch and her colleagues cited several
empirical finance articles showing an association between high
indexer density in a shareholder base and various governance
features the indexers favor, such as more independent directors,
fewer takeover defenses, and equalized shareholder voting
rights.249 But Bebchuk and Hirst pointed out an uncited subsequent
paper reporting similar research revealing that such high indexer
density is associated with certain reforms indexers disfavor, such
as CEOs becoming chairman.250
No issue is so generic as to be universal—not even the ritualistic
shareholder ratification of an auditor of the company’s financial
reports.251 The same is true for a wide variety of guideline practices
whose utility and value varies by company and is heavily debated
in the literature.252 That’s certainly the quality shareholder view.
Among the best illustrations of the stakes and the different
approaches between indexers and quality shareholders concerns
the central nervous system of corporate life: directors and boards,
discussed next.
C. Directors and Boards
Corporate law puts boards of directors at the center of corporate
governance.253 Corporate law empowers shareholders to elect
directors. It is perhaps the shareholders’ most consequential
decision. Yet approaches to this critical issue vary widely between
249. Id. at 26 n.38 (citing, among other research, Ian Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not
Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111 (2016)).
250. See Cornelius Schmidt & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Do Exogenous Changes in Passive
Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value?, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 285,
293–94 (2017). Another criticism of asserting an association between indexer density and
their favored policies, like reducing takeover defenses, is that many other informed
participants contend that such defenses are sometimes desirable and should be evaluated
case-by-case. See Sharon Hannes, The Hidden Virtue of Antitakeover Defenses, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1903, 1931–34 (2003); Sharon Hannes, The Market for Takeover Defenses, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
125, 142–70 (2007).
251. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Politicization of Corporate Governance: Bureaucratic
Discretion, the SEC, and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 501, 517 (2012).
252. E.g., supra notes 189–98 and accompanying text (staggered boards); supra notes
199–203 and accompanying text (CEO-chairman split or combined).
253. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020).
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indexers and quality shareholders. It would illuminate the indexing
debate to compare and contrast these two approaches. The following
first reviews the formulaic approach of the indexer guidelines and
second the analytical approach of the quality shareholder.254
1. Indexer guidelines
Consider the approach of the leading proxy adviser, ISS.
ISS opens its discussion of the board of directors not with
statements of competence or corporate stewardship, but with
“[f]our fundamental principles [that] apply when determining
votes on director nominees.”255 These are enumerated as
independence, composition, responsiveness, and accountability.256
Only the assessment of “responsiveness” is contextual—voting
“case-by-case.”257
On independence, ISS makes three prescriptions: (1) a majority
of directors must be independent; (2) the board must have three
standing committees operating under formal charters and staffed
only with independent directors—audit, compensation, and
nominating; and (3) there must either be a lead independent
director or an independent chairman (not also serving as an
executive officer).258
Many such rules have become commonly accepted in recent
decades, but the empirical evidence on their economic value remains
inconclusive.259 Consider the issue of director independence.260 Some
254. Indexer critics note a further anomaly: indexers seldom nominate directors. In fact,
during the past five years, none of the largest three indexers have formally nominated a
single director to any public company board. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 3, at 2098. In
contrast, quality shareholders frequently suggest nominees, and quite a few have served on
boards themselves. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8 (chapter 3).
255. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 8 (2019) [hereinafter
ISS GUIDELINES].
256. Id.
257. Id. at 12.
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 199–203 and accompanying text (addressing the issue of the role of
the chairman/CEO). The listed committees are functionally required by law; other
committee subjects are mentioned infra in text accompanying notes 274–75.
260. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999) (analyzing how board composition
affects firm performance); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002) (finding that firms with
more independent boards do not outperform other firms).
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evidence suggests a board’s independence is less important than its
active engagement.261 Other evidence suggests that certain kinds of
outside directors improve the performance of certain functions, such
as adherence to accounting requirements.262 But, clearly, there is a
trade-off between the expertise of inside directors and the
independence of outside directors.263
On composition, ISS again states three rules: (1) directors
should have diverse skills that add value to the board, rather than
duplicating backgrounds from particular viewpoints, ideally
presented in a graphical skills matrix to illustrate; (2) regular
meeting attendance is expected, defined as at least 75% of meetings
of the full board and committees; and (3) attention is expected,
determined by caps on the number of public company boards
individual directors may serve—five in general or two for CEOs.264
Critics challenge these composition directives as intrusive and
formulaic. Taking (2) and (3) first, attendance and attention are
clearly necessary, but not sufficient, to determine a valuable board
member. Rules of thumb are useful, but that is not how these rules
operate. That is why the board of directors’ section of so many
corporate websites portray check marks ticking off all the
governance formulas that major indexers and proxy advisers
champion. Attention is important, but caps are clearly arbitrary.265
On ISS’s first composition rule regarding accountability, it calls
for regular director elections, opposes staggered terms, and
believes in shareholder removal power, with or without cause. But
state corporate law permits all these and many other approaches to
director election and removal and leaves it to companies to choose
those best suited for their circumstances. As we have seen, there are
good arguments to evaluate these on a case-by-case basis.266
261. See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1317 (1998).
262. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of
the Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 479–81 (2008).
263. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 493 (2008).
264. ISS GUIDELINES, supra note 255, at 11.
265. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 8 (giving the example
of ISS opposing nomination of a widely-recognized executive and director for exceeding the
board service limit due solely to the fact that an incumbent company was divided into two
separate entities).
266. E.g., supra notes 189–98 and accompanying text (staggered boards); supra notes
199–203 and accompanying text (CEO-chairman split or combined). A final prong of ISS’s
accountability plank prescribes that each board undertake regular performance reviews

56

1.CUNNINGHAM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

57

2/9/2021 8:56 PM

Empowering Quality Shareholders

2. Comparing quality
Warren Buffett has often expressed his views on ideal directors
and boards—ideas that have a wide following among the rest of the
quality shareholder cohort.267 They seek directors with a
shareholder orientation, business savvy, and interest in the
particular company and its stewardship.268 Particular director traits
and the specific context of a given company are more important
than following general formulas or perceived best practices.
The number one question quality shareholders want to know
about any director candidates, however, is whether they are
shareholder oriented. That is, all directors should act as if there is a
single absentee owner and do everything reasonably possible to
advance that owner’s long-term interest.269
This is not a mandate for the immediate maximization of
shareholder value, but rather a mentality to evaluate every decision
from the shareholder perspective. To that end, it is desirable for
directors to buy and hold sizable personal stakes in companies they
serve, so that they truly walk in the shoes of owners.270
The board’s most important job is selecting an outstanding
CEO. If the board secures an outstanding CEO, it will likely face
few other major problems. All CEOs must be measured according
to a set of performance standards. A board’s outside directors must
formulate these standards and regularly evaluate the CEO in light
of them—without the CEO being present.271 Standards should be
tailored to the particular business culture but should stress
fundamental baselines, such as returns on shareholder capital and
of itself. This is another fashion in corporate governance that is reinforced by consulting
firms offering the service. CHRISTOPHER D. MCKENNA, THE WORLD’S NEWEST PROFESSION:
MANAGEMENT CONSULTING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Louis Galambos & Geoffrey Jones
2006). The task of self-evaluation, while important, is challenging, and observers are justified
in skepticism about the results.
267. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett’s Ten Commandments for Directors,
NACD DIRECTORSHIP, July–August 2017, at 28; Lawrence Cunningham, Warren Buffett’s
Ten
Commandments
for
Directors,
EUR.
FIN.
REV.
(July
27,
2017),
https://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/warren-buffetts-10-commandments-forcompany-directors/; Lawrence Cunningham, Warren Buffett’s 10 Commandments for Running
a Successful Business, CNBC (July 17, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/17/warrenbuffetts-10-commandments-on-boardroom-power-and-success.html.
268. See BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS, supra note 17.
269. Id. at 45.
270. Id. at 31–32 (Berkshire’s owner-related business principles, number 2).
271. Id.
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progress in market value per share over multiple years. Above all,
directors should evaluate the CEO’s record on capital allocation
measured against a hurdle rate it sets.272If the CEO’s performance
persistently falls short of the standards set by the directors, then the
board must replace the CEO. The same goes for all other senior
managers boards oversee, just as an intelligent owner would
if present.
In addressing these problems, the director’s actions must be
fair, swift, and decisive. Directors who perceive a managerial
problem should immediately alert other directors to the issue. If
enough are persuaded, concerted action can be readily coordinated
to resolve the problem.
Here, too, shareholders can play a role. Companies can make
their directors available to their largest long-term quality
shareholders.273 These representatives can discuss issues put to
shareholder votes that affect enduring value. A few influential
quality shareholders, acting together, can effectively reform a given
company’s corporate governance simply by withholding their
votes for directors who were tolerating odious behavior.
On board committees, finally, corporate law requires that
boards approve major acquisitions and dividends, and as a
practical matter, approve share buyback programs.274 Along with
such approvals, good practice dictates that the board’s principal
role is setting applicable hurdle rates, for reinvestment
and acquisitions.
Companies wishing to make capital allocation a priority could
consider whether to create a board committee with this oversight.
At S&P 500 companies, boards maintain an average of four
committees, and about one-third include a committee on capital
allocation, finance, or investment.275 Charters might call for postinvestment reviews on all important allocations, especially organic
growth initiatives, acquisitions, and share buybacks.

272. See Case Studies of Companies That Do Capital Allocation Right, MOI GLOBAL
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://moiglobal.com/phil-ordway-201901/.
273. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8 (chapter 8).
274. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2020) (dividends); § 160 (repurchases technically
do not explicitly require board approval but statutory rules violations expose directors to
personal liability); § 251 (mergers).
275. See supra note 272.
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With capital allocation being the central driver of business
value, from the quality shareholders’ analytical perspective, it is
natural that this cohort would discuss the idea of a board
committee on the subject. The indexer guidelines, of course, do not.
3. A note on activists
A turn to the subset of quality shareholders who go activist
is in order. Activist shareholders regularly identify and recruit
able director nominees to serve on boards of corporations they
target. These director nominees are often experts in the relevant
industry or on aspects of perceived board weaknesses, such as
corporate governance. They may often be the kinds of directors
quality shareholders would seek and nominate themselves. But the
context where such nominations arise can compromise actual or
perceived stewardship.
First, there is longstanding concern that directors appointed as
the result of activist support will be more beholden to the activist
than to the other shareholders. This concern is constrained
somewhat by a director’s fiduciary duties, which require acting for
the corporation, not any particular shareholder.
But circumstances can aggravate the problem. For instance,
some activists have offered their nominees bonuses for achieving
stated corporate results during their tenure, including certain stock
price levels. Such “golden leashes,” as they are called, increase the
risk that the director is beholden to the sponsor.276
In addition, a payout set based on stock price could influence
important business judgments, such as optimal borrowing levels
and whether to make or accept acquisition offers. For these reasons,
special bonuses for certain directors risk creating board factions
and infighting.
Second, when appointed as the result of a settlement, outside
normal governance procedures, the other shareholders do not get a
vote. Such arrangements can lead to board members that appeal
unduly to the activist and incumbents.

276. See Gregory H. Shill, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1246 (2017).
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One solution to this problem is to put settlements to votes of the
other shareholders.277 This would assure appointment of directors
with consensus support, as well as validate any other aspects of the
settlement, such as committee assignments, director removal, terms
and term limits, and corporate governance guidelines.278
In sum, the indexing debate over incentives, capacity, and
“guideline” approach to governance is vital. It can be enriched by
adding the perspective of the quality shareholder. All of this
matters, above all, because of the increasingly important role
shareholders play in corporate governance. The frequency and
significance of shareholder balloting and the fragmentation of
shareholder types is what leads to ultimate debates in corporate
law concerning shareholder voting rules, to which we turn next.
IV. SHAREHOLDER VOTING RULES
State corporate law requires corporations to submit certain
matters to a shareholder vote.279 These matters include election and
removal of directors, bylaw or charter amendments, mergers,
substantial asset divestments, and dissolution.280 Federal securities
law supplements these state laws by regulating the process of
shareholder voting,281 and sometimes requiring votes, most notably

277. John H. Matheson & Vilena Nicolet, Shareholder Democracy and Special Interest
Governance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1650, 1694 (2019). These authors start with the premise that
shareholder democracy is a virtue, manifested in improved governance or voting on
staggered boards, majority elections, say on pay, and proxy access. They are concerned that
settlement of activist threats impairs democracy. It operates outside main governance
mechanisms through private means advancing private agendas—of both activists and target
boards against the rest of the shareholders. They analogize to other similar settings—threats
to corporate control to interested director transactions—to offer a statute making such
settlement agreements void unless approved by a majority of the other shares.
278. Finally, investors with holding periods less than one year cast votes in annual
elections, despite the fact that they will not continue to be a shareholder for the directors’ full
term. Even investors with holding periods less than two or three years who cast votes in
electing staggered boards will not be around for as long as the directors they elect.
279. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
407, 420 (2006).
280. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2020) (director elections); § 242 (charter
amendments); § 251 (mergers); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04 (AM. BAR FOUND. 2003)
(mergers); § 10.03 (charter amendments); § 10.20 (bylaw amendments).
281. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a) (2019).
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on executive compensation.282 Managers or shareholders can
make additional proposals calling for a shareholder vote on
topics ranging from interested transactions to disclosures about
climate change.283
State corporate law provides that each corporate share is
entitled to one vote on all such matters, unless a company’s charter
adopts a different rule.284 State law permits a wide variety of
alternative voting regimes, including several classes of shares with
different voting rights, shares without votes or with multiple votes,
as well as shares that accrue votes when held for long periods or
that enjoy fewer votes when held by a large block owner.285
Although federal securities laws defer almost entirely to state
corporate law on voting rules, stock exchange rules limit some of
this variation, at least for companies already listed.286
While state corporate law grants vast power to boards of
directors to oversee and manage a corporation,287 these shareholder
voting rules give shareholders a significant voice on many
consequential issues. In recent years, the number and importance
of matters submitted for shareholder voting have both increased.288
Fragmentation of the shareholder base has accentuated the
importance of shareholder voting, as this is the favored route for
shareholder activists to shape corporate policy and an occasion
when indexers wield their power. These forces have combined to
produce experimentation with alternative voting arrangements.
Although the baseline voting rule remains one-share, one-vote,
more companies have switched to alternatives, and debate has
ensued.289 In this debate, the traditional rule is heralded as a
282. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 951(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n-1(a)(2).
283. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Social Activism Through Shareholder Activism, 76 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1129 (2019).
284. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a).
285. See supra note 279.
286. See Paul Mason, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller & Steven Utke, Does
Shareholder Voting Matter? Evidence from the Takeover Market, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 157,
171 (2018).
287. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
288. See Fisch et al., The New Titans, supra note 3, at 40.
289. E.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote, and the False
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (2008); Paul H. Edelman &
Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the Takeover Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 464 (2005).
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democratic gold standard, against which all alternatives must
be measured. This Part reviews the three alternatives that have
attracted the most attention: dual class, tenured, and exclusionary,
putting each in context, and assessing the pros and cons.
The review leads logically to a novel alternative, which I
propose, that increases the power of long-term committed
owners—quality shareholders. I dub this regime “quality voting.”
Besides logical closure in relating the relevant elements of the
debate to voting rules, quality voting will appeal to companies
interested in attracting higher densities of quality shareholders.
A. Dual Class: Anti-Activist
The one-share, one-vote regime is easiest to conceptualize and
implement in a company with a single class of stock outstanding.
Every share of that class has one vote, and all other shareholder
rights are the same, as to matters such as dividends or liquidation
rights. But state corporate law has long permitted companies to
have more than one class of stock, with variable voting and other
rights, so long as the rights of each class are the same within the
class.290 This approach is valuable to enable issuing preferred stock
like, for instance, a security that blends features of common equity
with debt.291
While allowable under state corporate law, maintaining two
classes of common stock has sparked controversy since at least
1925. The details of each dual class structure vary, but the general
design grants greater voting power to one class than to the other.
Participants all see a trade-off between the increased incentives of
those with the greater voting power to make value-enhancing
decisions and the decreased monitoring capability of those with
lesser voting power. People disagree, often strongly, about the net
effects of the trade-off. This Section charts the regulatory path of
this debate back to 1925 through today, stressing how a greater
emphasis on the distinctive role that quality shareholders play
would add to this debate.

290. E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.04 (AM. BAR FOUND. 2003).
291. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (and Why We Should
Care About It), 51 BUS. LAW. 443, 445 (1996).
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1. Law and practice
In a famous 1925 offering, Dodge Brothers, Inc. adopted two
classes of stock with different voting rights.292 One class had
multiple votes per share, while the other had the usual one vote per
share. A public howl of protest erupted, as the era’s populists
condemned the lopsided arrangement. Critics observed that the
owner of the high-vote stock held shares worth only $2.25 million
in a company with a market value of $130 million—yet controlled
a majority of the voting power.
In this era, such matters were governed entirely by state
corporation law, though this episode contributed to the forces that
led to enacting of federal securities laws in 1933 along with
exploring how stock exchange listing rules could supplement state
corporate law.293 The real issue with such dual class capital
structures is that they vest control in a group without matching
economic risks: despite equal investments, one class has more votes
per share than the other. The controlling class is insulated from
short term pressure but also from accountability.
In the aftermath of the Dodge Brothers offering, the stock
exchanges barred listing of new companies using multiple classes
of stock. That ban remained in effect through 1985. The New York
Stock Exchange granted a few waivers, with conditions,
particularly when founders showed special skills or vision
warranting such enhanced power.294 Other exchanges, such as
Nasdaq, also banned dual class subject to conditions such as a
minimum portion of minority board seats, a maximum ratio of
control shares to minority shares, and anti-dilution protections.
In the late 1980s, the dual class structure’s voting arrangement
captured newfound public attention after many boards began to
use it to defeat unwanted tender offer bids.295 In a common practice,
292. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986).
293. See John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in
the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 37 (2001).
294. For instance, in 1980 it listed Nike Inc., whose shares were identical except that
those held by founder Phil Knight could elect three-fourths of the board. Knight said he
would not have taken the company public otherwise. Knight’s structure remained in place
for decades, even after his retirement. See Pamela Park, Nike Founder Maintains Control Despite
Retirement, WESTLAW CORP. GOVERNANCE DAILY BRIEFING, July 6, 2015.
295. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 3, 44 (1988).
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a company facing a threat to control would recapitalize by offering
to replace one existing class of stock with two new classes. One of
the new classes offered low voting rights but high dividends while
the other offered the reverse.296
As boards making such an offering intended, managers and
other pro-management shareholders traded their shares for the
high vote class while public shareholders, preferring cash
dividends to abstract voting rights, went for the low vote class.
While state corporate law allowed such a gambit, the SEC regarded
the practice as coercive. In 1989, it adopted a federal rule
prohibiting stock exchanges from listing companies proposing dual
class capital structures.297
A federal court struck the SEC’s rule on administrative
grounds.298 But the exchanges nevertheless adopted the listing
rules, and they remain in effect.299 These rules apply to existing
companies, barring recapitalizations, but not to newly listed
companies with dual class structures upon initial public offerings
(IPOs). Dual class structures have been particularly appealing to
new listings for technology companies, with a wave of such
offerings occurring in the mid-2000s as the tech sector rallied and
again in the last few years since 2017. Today, some 250 listed
companies maintain dual class capital structures.300
2. Debate and data
In the longstanding debate, proponents of dual class argue that
entrepreneurs need to retain voting control to protect their
companies from intense, short-sighted pressure of activist
shareholders. The reasoning follows, however, that the founder’s
“special sauce” offers initial value but tends to fade with time and
depends on consistent personal engagement.
296. See Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and
to Professor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 979 (1989).
297. SEC Rel. Nos. 34-25891, 34-25891A (July 1988).
298. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407–08 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
299. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4,
69 WASH. U. L. Q. 5675 (1991).
300. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, DUAL CLASS COMPANIES LIST (2017)
[hereinafter CII MULTI-CLASS PAPER], https://www.cii.org/files/3_17_17_List_of_
DC_for_Website(1).pdf (culled from Russell 3000 companies). Actually, quite a few have
multiple classes of stock with varying voting rights, so they are “multiple class” capital
structures, but the phrase “dual class” is most commonly used to capture all variations.
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More recently, the debate has come to focus on duration: people
could accept the structure as long as it wasn’t permanent.301 The
issues became how long would the dual class terms endure, and
under what circumstances might they cease? Before 2000, nearly
two-thirds of dual class offerings had no sunset provisions. But
expiration terms have become common, whether at fixed times
such as five to ten years or upon events such as the founder’s death
or incapacity.302
Despite such compromises, extreme cases arise that lead to
extreme reactions. Take the 2017 IPO of Snap Inc., whose public
shares carried no voting rights. Many observers fulminated.303
Some campaigned for the SEC or stock exchanges to ban the
practice.304 Although authorities refrained, advocates persuaded
certain market index compilers to exclude such companies from
their indexes,305 adding a new force in corporate governance.306
Advocates for dual class take a different view. As Professor
Lund explains, the debate over nonvoting stock—and dual class
generally—pits critics concerned that the approach impairs
accountability against proponents who stress the long-term
value.307 She then explored how such capital structures segment the
shareholder base into informed and uninformed investors.308
Informed investors are better motivated to support optimal
governance for long-term value and may even pay a premium to
own higher-voting stock.309 Companies catering to different

301. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585 (2017).
302. See Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1057
(2019) (protesting calendar expiration dates though willing to accept event-driven terminations).
303. CII MULTI-CLASS PAPER, supra note 300 (calling the Snap IPO “egregious”). For a
calmer, intellectual approach, see Amy Deen Westbrook and David A. Westbrook, Snapchat’s
Gift: Equity Culture in High-Tech Firms, 46 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 861 (2019).
304. CII MULTI-CLASS PAPER, supra note 300 (reporting numerous investor requests to
major index providers to exclude multi-class structures).
305. Id. (reporting that FTSE Russell excludes any company whose share float is
less than 5% of total voting power; S&P Dow prospectively excludes any company
adopting multi-class).
306. See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion,
99 B.U. L. REV. 1229 (2019).
307. Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance,
71 STAN. L. REV. 687 (2019).
308. Id. at 696.
309. Id. at 698.
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shareholder types with such tailored share offerings therefore
increase firm value, she says.310
Turning to the evidence, it does not support a flat ban on dual
class structures nor a universal endorsement of them. First, despite
being excluded from some indexes, many companies continue to
offer them and many shareholders continue to buy them.311 The
number and percentage of newly listed companies with dual class
structures has not changed much312—though the total market
capitalization of such companies has fallen substantially.313 The
frequency and duration of sunset provisions have not moved much
either—about one-fifth of new dual class structures continue to
have sunsets, typically after ten years.
Second, many dual class structures are carefully tailored to suit
individual corporate and shareholder circumstances. For example,
about fifteen companies use complex formulas to allocate corporate
power, and another fifteen provide for specific allocations of board
seats, some by number of slots and others by percentage.314 Several
adjust the voting rules on extraordinary matters such as mergers,
either reducing the super-voting shares to one vote or increasing
the other class to one vote.315
Third, and most important for this Article’s thesis: quality
shareholders often embrace companies with dual class structures.
Among companies with dual class structures, most attract a high
density of quality shareholders.316 One reason for this appetite,
310. Id. at 696. Distinguishing between informed and uninformed shareholders is
useful to probe shareholder base, cultivation, and related policies. Standing alone, however,
the attribute is difficult to test. Other behavioral categories probe this factor, however,
particularly the combination of horizon and conviction.
311. See Dual-Class IPO Snapshot: 2017–2019 Statistics, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS.
(June
2019),
https://www.cii.org/files/2019%20Dual%20Class%20Update%20for%
20Website%20FINAL(2).pdf.
312. Id. (19%, 11%, and 26% in 2017, 2018, 2019 (through first half), respectively).
313. Id. (49%, 17%, and 15%).
314. See CII MULTI-CLASS PAPER, supra note 300 (culled from Russell 3000 companies).
For instance, at Forest City Realty Trust, Graham Holdings, Madison Square Garden,
Scholastic, and Scripps, one class is entitled to elect a majority of the board, typically twothirds, while another can elect the rest. Some have plain vanilla terms—more votes on all
matters to one class than another, including some fifty companies within the Russell 3000
that have at least one class of stock without any voting rights. Id.
315. Id. (examples: News Corporation, Sinclair Broadcast, Sonic Automotive,
Virtu Financial).
316. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8. The analysis compares
CII’s list of 225 companies with my ranking of companies based on the density of quality
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particularly in contrast to the indexers’ universal condemnation: a
categorial condemnation of dual class capital structures ignores
their utility in specific scenarios.317
In fact, one leading voice in the quality shareholder community
publishes an investment advisory entitled “index orphans.”318 It
highlights investment opportunities among excellent companies
expelled from the indexes for various reasons, including thanks to
having dual class structures.
As this evidence suggests, debates over the merits of dual
class would benefit by considering views of the quality
shareholder cohort.
B. Tenured Voting: Anti-Transient
Scholars whose normative goal is to encourage long-term share
ownership have recently advocated for increasing the voting power
of long-held shares. This concept—synonymously called tenured
voting, time-weighted voting, or time-phased voting—prescribes
that a share’s voting power is increased after it has been held for a
given number of years.
A common approach grants four votes instead of one to each
share held longer than four years. When those shares are sold, they
revert back to one-vote shares. Designs vary to suit, with
differences in the definitions of short and long term (upping votes
after three, five, or ten years say), reward increments (adding one
vote per two years or two votes per one year), and matters covered
(all matters coming to a vote or only designated matters, such
as mergers).319
In theory, by rewarding long-term ownership, average holding
periods should rise, and stock volatility should fall. From the
shareholders in their shareholder base. In particular, 135 companies appear on both lists.
Among those, 64% appeared in the top half for quality shareholder density.
317. Adopters include family companies (such as Tootsie Roll Industries); entrepreneur
firms (such as Tilly’s); and those whose industries demand a long-term focus, such as
journalism (New York Times Co.), spirits (Brown Forman), and finance (Houlihan Lokey).
See Dual-Class IPO Snapshot: 2017–2019 Statistics, supra note 311.
318. See BOYAR RESEARCH, 43 BOYAR’S INDEX ORPHANS 1 (Oct. 12, 2017). Boyar has
identified some 750 public companies of this sort—all with market capitalizations exceeding
$1 billion and 60 exceeding $10 billion. Examples include IAC/InterActiveCorp, Axalta
Coating Systems, Madison Square Garden Company, and MSG Networks.
319. See Rock, Eugenics, supra note 79, at 901 (“Each implementation can have a different
effect on the shifting of influence among the shareholding population.”).
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shareholders’ viewpoint, tenured voting remains as democratic as
one-share, one-vote: all shares and shareholders enjoy identical
opportunities to gain enhanced voting rights.320
A major and underappreciated problem, however, is that
holding period length is an imperfect proxy for wisdom or good
judgment.321 After all, if long-term shareholders are indexers
with insufficient interest in particular companies while newer
shareholders are prepared to engage productively, tenured
voting backfires.322
While the emerging literature is increasingly robust, most of the
analysis has focused on the horizon effects of tenured voting, with
limited attention to this issue of conviction. This subsection reviews
the prevailing literature while stressing that an equal emphasis on
conviction should inform the debate over tenured voting.
1. Law and theory
Unlike dual class, only a dozen U.S. public companies have ever
adopted tenured voting, though laws in France and Italy since 2014
have required it for many public companies there.323As a result, far
less scholarly attention had been paid to tenured voting until recent
years.324 Interest in tenured voting was sparked by a series of major

320. See Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
321. See Rock, Eugenics, supra note 79, at 902.
322. See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1718–19 (1985) (among the earliest criticisms, calling tenured voting
“problematical” and a “showstopper” against hostile takeover bids since shares, upon
purchase by hostile bidder, would lose voting power for several years, longer than any could
wait, making this anti-takeover defense “immovable”).
323. In France, lawmakers in 2014 made tenured voting the default for listed French
companies, unless shareholders vote to opt out of it. Many companies, including half the
largest listed companies, have been using tenured voting, with a two-year minimum holding
period. Early empirical results suggest considerable value associated with tenured
voting—called loyalty shares in France. See François Belot, Edith Ginglinger &
Laura T. Starks, Encouraging Long-Term Shareholders: The Effects of Loyalty Shares with Double
Voting Rights (Université Paris-Dauphine, Research Paper No. 3475429, 2019),
www.ssrn.com/abstract=3475429. Companies opting out of loyalty shares suffered a
negative market reaction, while those adhering to tenured voting enjoyed a positive market
reaction. The theory? Loyalty shares encourage costly monitoring by long-term
shareholders, providing potential benefits to all shareholders.
324. This assertion is based on a Lexis search in the law review library for “time-phased
voting” or “time-weighted voting” or “tenured voting.” Aside from a flurry of references
during the period surrounding the SEC’s intervention concerning dual class recaps, scattered
and indirect references appeared in the following years during that period (one per year
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articles led by Lynne Dallas, appearing in 2012, 2016, and 2017.325
Since then, in addition to numerous passing references,
two important articles on shareholder cultivation treated the
innovation carefully,326 and two more recent articles take the topic
up head-on.327
Most of this literature reviews the legal authority to permit
tenured voting. These discuss state corporation law as well as stock
exchange listing rules—the federal securities laws having virtually
no role since the SEC’s aborted flirtation with intervening in the
dual class context.328 The consensus is overwhelming that state
corporation law, certainly in the leading state of Delaware,
authorizes
this
and
many
other
variations
of
voting arrangements.329
Two landmark cases support this consensus conclusion, one by
analogy and one directly. In the analogy case, Providence &
Worcester Co. v. Baker,330 the court upheld a scaled voting scheme
where voting power varied with a shareholder’s stake—in this case,
the greater the stake, the lower the voting power.331 Plaintiffs
challenged the scheme under a state corporate statute requiring
uniform voting powers by class.332 In rejecting this challenge, the
court reasoned that the provision applied equally to every share,

unless otherwise noted): 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005 (three times, all in lists of examples),
2006, 2007 (two times), 2008 (two times), 2009, and 2010.
325. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 265 (2012); Dallas & Barry, supra note 9; Lynne Dallas, Is There Hope for Change? The
Evolution of Conceptions of “Good” Corporate Governance, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491 (2017).
326. See Belinfanti, supra note 64; Rock, Eugenics, supra note 79.
327. See Berger et al., supra note 4; Edelman et al., supra note 4.
328. See Rock, Eugenics, supra note 79, at 902 (“[I]t is also permissible under federal
securities regulation. . . . Federal securities law takes no official position regarding
departures from one-share, one-vote.”); Edelman et al., supra note 4.
329. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2020) (making one-share, one-vote the default
rule and authorizing substantial tailoring, so long as consistent with other provisions of the
statute, by the board alone before a stock sale and by board-shareholder approved charter
amendment afterwards).
330. Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
331. See Buxbaum, supra note 322, at 1694, 1694 n.101 (“The provision allocated one vote
for each twenty shares owned after the first fifty shares, and prohibited a stockholder from
voting more than one-quarter of the shares issued and outstanding, unless as proxy for
others. As a result, the plaintiff, who was the largest shareholder, had twenty-eight percent
of the shares yet only three percent of the voting power.”)
332. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a).
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and thus was uniform as to shares, and operated unevenly only as
to those shareholders crossing certain ownership levels.333
The other landmark case, Williams v. Geier,334 directly upheld a
proposed tenured voting structure. Existing shares won ten votes
per share. Upon their transfer, they would revert to one vote per
share, and newly issued shares would also have one vote per
share—but all those held thirty-six months would accrue ten votes.
The court considered the board’s proposal to be an ordinary
business judgment entitled to utmost judicial deference.335
If scholars agree that the case law clearly upholds tenured
voting, there is more debate about whether stock exchange listing
rules restrict it. Scholars routinely point to the New York Stock
Exchange listing rule on voting rights, which by its terms, prevents
a listed company from switching to tenured voting.336
But three qualifications have been made: Professor Belinfanti
notes that stock exchange interpretive guidelines could warrant a
waiver for a company with rational business concerns about shorttermism,337 Professor Rock views any such impediment to

333. The case is cited in the time weighted voting literature as an analogous structure.
See Edelman et al., supra note 4, at 999 (“The scaled voting structure in Providence & Worcester
is analogous to tenure voting, simply substituting the limiting factor of holding duration for
holding size.”). Its holding squarely covers one of the features that could be used to define
quality voting, as discussed in Section IV.D.
334. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (overruling a decision by New York
federal district court in Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), which purported to reject the validity of tenured voting under
Delaware law).
335. The plan was neither a defensive measure under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), which required elevated scrutiny for reasonableness as the trial
court had held, nor an infringement on the shareholder franchise under Blasius Indus., Inc. v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), which required enhanced scrutiny as the plaintiffs
had urged.
336. E.g., Rock, Eugenics, supra note 79, at 903 (quoting the NYSE listing requirement to
which the NACD has a similar counterpart: “Voting rights of existing shareholders of
publicly traded common stock . . . cannot be disparately reduced or restricted through any
corporate action or issuance. Examples of such corporate action or issuance include, but are
not limited to, the adoption of time phased voting plans, the adoption of capped voting rights
plans, the issuance of super voting stock, or the issuance of stock with voting rights less than
the per share voting rights of the existing common stock through an exchange offer.”).
337. Belinfanti, supra note 64, at 834 (quoting the NYSE listed company manual: “[t]he
Exchange’s interpretations under [its voting rights policy] will be flexible, recognizing that
both the capital markets and the circumstances and needs of listed companies change
over time”).
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recognized alternative voting regimes as ill-advised,338 and
Professors Berger et al. believe that the reasoning in Providence
should apply to the interpretation of the NYSE rules to permit
tenured voting.339
As a matter of corporate policy, two corporate law scholars
have recognized tenured voting as a valid method of shareholder
cultivation for companies seeking a longer-term base. Belinfanti
opines: “As a cultivation tool, it rewards stewardship capital on one
hand, and potentially discourages . . . flippers and short-term
gamblers.”340 Rock stresses incentives: “[I]t provides greater
incentives to longer-term shareholders to invest in making those
decisions and greater incentive to remain shareholders to enjoy the
increased voting rights.”341 Rock refrains from opining on whether
this would be desirable or not, however, noting downsides.342
On balance, though, Rock favors the flexibility offered:
In an age of empowered shareholders, in which firms should
think about selecting and shaping an optimal shareholder base,
prohibiting a key design tool is inappropriate. . . . [F]irms and
shareholders should at least have the option to experiment with
different ways of shaping the shareholder base.343

338. Rock, Eugenics, supra note 79, at 903.
339. Berger et al., supra note 4, at 319–20 (rule forbids “disparately” reducing voting
rights, but switching to a tenured voting is non-disparate because it is equally applicable to
all shares held for stated durations). Edelman et al. are not sure and said they are not aware
of any company that has done so. Edelman et al., supra note 4, at 1002–03 (“The NYSE voting
rights policy precludes companies from adopting tenure voting plans for existing shares. . . .
[M]ost commentators agree that listing rules allow the adoption of tenure voting at only the
IPO stage.”).
340. Belinfanti, supra note 64, at 834.
341. Rock, Eugenics, supra note 79, at 901.
342. Downsides are the “inverse of the upsides,” including cementing insider control
despite small stakes. Another is this caution: “[I]f long-term shareholders are typically index
funds who, in competing on price, resist portfolio firm-specific investments . . . .” Rock,
Eugenics, supra note 79, at 902. This is an important caution about how a voting regime
focused on horizon can be impaired by a problem of conviction. It is an example of the
importance of combining both horizon and conviction in a single analysis as well as the need
to recognize that not all long-term shareholders are “typically index funds.” Many are
quality shareholders.
343. Id. at 903–04.
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2. Research and data
The research that reignited interest in tenured voting began
with Professor Dallas, whose 2017 work with Professor Berry
investigated its implications for corporate governance and effects
on managerial myopia.344 The article’s main points were a policy
view of tenured voting and an examination of the dozen U.S.
companies that have tried it. They considered three rationales for
tenured voting: increasing power of long-term shareholders,
encouraging longer hold periods, and nudging corporate culture
towards a long-term value focus.345
The study found that the plans did not reduce managerial
myopia by lengthening shareholder holding periods,346 nor did it
affect institutional ownership or increase long-term ownership,
which actually decreased. They found that, like dual class, tenured
voting increased the wedge between ownership and control, as
insiders could sell shares over time while maintaining voting
power. The increased agency costs were not offset by a greater
long-term focus.347 Despite these findings, the authors encouraged
continued experimentation with tenured voting, stressing
almost exclusively its implications concerning horizon, rather
than conviction.
More recently, Professor Berger and his co-authors proposed
tenured voting as a way to address short-termism, presenting it as
a better alternative to dual class.348 They approach the prescription
principally in terms of time horizon, stressing perceived shorttermism from shortening average holding periods and increasing
activism.349 They argue that tenured voting creates incentives to
hold for long periods, reduces short-term myopia, attracts longterm capital, and promotes a long-term corporate culture.350
Amid the authors’ impassioned entreaties focused on time
horizon, there is only limited attention to conviction, and none to
the quality shareholder. On the subject of conviction, the scholars

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
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Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 551.
Id. at 570–71.
Id. at 620–21.
Id. at 611–12.
Berger et al., supra note 4, at 297.
Id. at 298–300.
Id. at 307–09.
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say only that tenured voting should not be expected to attract any
additional indexers to a shareholder base. That is true, of course,
because indexers do not make investment decisions based on such
firm-specific governance features.
Most recently, Professor Edelman and his co-authors were
motivated by concerns that tenured voting can entrench
management,351 so they analyzed its likely effect in a contested
board election. Their model recognizes additional tenured voting
power in incumbents, less voting power in the hands of an activist
new to ownership, and variable voting power among the variety
of other shareholders. (The model did not distinguish among
varying levels of concentration or diversification.) They made two
major findings.
First, when insiders of a company adopting tenured voting own
and keep a sizable block—20% to 30%—that proves a formidable
deterrent to even their most committed opponents who might seek
to acquire voting control. Second, if such insiders instead sold
down to a point where majority voting power fell into institutional
investor hands, the tenured voting mechanisms no longer protect
the insiders’ control.
The upshot, for the authors, is to view tenured voting as a
reasonable compromise between one-share, one-vote and dual
class, in that it grants incumbent inside controls an edge but only if
they maintain substantial skin in the game. Given that finding, it
would also be interesting to investigate the further effects of
granting additional voting power based on conviction—more votes
to concentrated than to diversified shareholders. We move to that
in Section D; first consider, briefly, current proposals to sterilize the
votes of index funds.

351. Id. at 297. This concern appears particularly strong in Italy, where critics express
concern that the intention to elongate shareholder time horizons can also entrench
managerial tenures. Chiara Mosca, Should Shareholders Be Rewarded for Loyalty? European
Experiments on the Wedge Between Tenured Voting and Takeover Law, 8 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 245, 245 (2019) (“[T]enured voting rights disappoint their
expectations and are rarely used to meet a true need of long termism.”). Such regimes do not
increase the level of engagement of passive indexers. See Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive
Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 803 (2018).
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C. Variations: Anti-Indexer
Corporate law scholars have identified numerous concerns
about indexers casting shareholder votes, ranging from limited
monitoring capabilities to incentives to favor managers, as
discussed in Part III. Calls to eliminate or curtail related
shareholder voting rights ensue. All focus on indexer passivity—
lack of conviction—rather than time horizon.
Professor Lund proposes for index funds to abstain from voting
altogether—contrary to current law which requires large
institutional investors to cast their ballots.352 The rationale is that
indexers, based on the critical evidence summarized in Part III, lack
requisite incentives or capacity to become informed about
corporate voting. The effect would increase the voting power of
quality shareholders as well as all non-indexers, whatever their
time horizons or other attributes.353
Professors Bebchuk and Hirst oppose Lund’s proposals for two
reasons. First, despite their criticism of indexers outlined in Part III,
that does not lead them to think that the voting decisions of other
investors are superior. Their main criticism here, however, lumps
all non-indexers (and non-managers) together without separately
recognizing the quality shareholder cohort.
Instead, they single out “individual retail investors” as lacking
requisite incentives to become informed,354 and “active mutual
fund managers” as not having shown superior investment in
becoming informed compared to indexers.355 Attention to quality
shareholders might change this analysis.
A second form of anti-indexer voting measures would require
the funds to pass their voting rights through to the beneficial
owners of the fund.356 This likewise seeks to remedy the limited
incentives and capacity the fund has to cast informed votes.
352. Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493
(2018); see also Todd M. Henderson & Dorothy S. Lund, Index Funds Are Great for Investors,
Risky for Corporate Governance, WALL STREET J., June 23, 2017, at A15.
353. Lund, supra note 352, at 528–30. An alternative would focus on the perceived promanagement bias of index funds and allocate indexers’ votes in proportion to the votes of
non-management non-indexers. See id. at 530–31.
354. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 3, at 2218 n.227.
355. Id. at 2218 n.228.
356. See Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund
Giants, 79 MD. L. REV. 954 (2020).
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Bebchuk and Hirst again fairly thought they could benefit from
delineating the shareholder base further. As they stand, the
objections are almost entirely concerned with individual fund
beneficiaries, when indexers also manage assets for many different
kinds of institutions (if not quality shareholders).357
The logical next step after these criticisms—and all three
pending debates over shareholder voting regimes—is quality
voting, an approach that zeroes in on two behaviors all participants
seem to laud: shareholders with a long-term horizon and high level
of conviction.
D. Quality Voting: Pro-quality
To recap this Part so far, dual class voting structures are
motivated by entrepreneurs averse to shareholder activism or other
short-term pressures, though their own economic stakes are not as
concentrated; tenured voting is motivated by policy advocates to
reduce short-termism; and anti-indexer variations are motivated by
policy advocates to negate the arguably ill-informed diversified
indexers. The rationale of each scheme is binary—a focus on shortor long-term horizon for dual class and tenured and a focus on
relative concentration for the anti-indexer variations.
It is logical to consider conjoining both long-term and
concentrated behavior in a voting policy that I will call quality
voting. Quality voting increases the power of long-term committed
owners—quality shareholders. It refines tenured voting to account
not only for duration but conviction.

357. Professor Griffith offers another approach which would compromise based on the
type of voting topic in terms of whether funds have a plausible information advantage
compared to their customers, distinguishing between, for instance, mergers versus social
proposals. See Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual
Fund Voting Authority, 98 TEX. L. REV. 983 (2020). While interesting, this proposal faces the
definitional challenge of classifying the type of voting topic as well as the same issue of
rational apathy of the account holders. I concur with the rationale for such an assertion,
which is that funds and many corporate governance experts overestimate their ability to rank
governance provisions from good to bad on an abstract basis.
Professors Lund and Griffith co-authored another piece advocating for an even more
interesting approach to address conflicts of interests that index funds face. Sean J. Griffith &
Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151,
1181–86 (2019). They look at conflicts arising from mutual fund structures and suggest the
solution of excluding their vote in votes requiring a minimum level of disinterested shares
to carry.
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Participants in the debate will have varying responses to a
proposal to increase voting power of both long-term and
concentrated shares. But while many skeptics may remain skeptics,
some may see things differently: proponents of one or the other
approach may agree or disagree with quality voting; those who
support both may have already come to the same conclusion as this
Article does without having yet contributed it to the literature.
To better explain the specifics of quality voting, this Article
compares it to other regimes discussed above, namely, dual class
voting and tenured voting.
1. Comparing regimes
Unlike dual class voting, quality voting remains democratic. It
does not inevitably or irremovably cement control in designated
hands but operates as a fluid advantage that fluctuates as investors
rebalance their portfolios over time in varying weights.
As with tenured voting, quality voting is almost certainly
permitted under corporate law—in fact, one of the two landmark
cases in this area, Providence, addressed a plan more akin to quality
voting than to tenured voting (though it was the inverse, capping
voting rights of concentrated shares, whereas quality voting would
multiply voting rights of concentrated shares). The case under New
York Stock Exchange rules remains equivocal but is stronger than
for tenured voting, since the text of the rule expressly refers to “time
phased voting plans.”358
Also, as with tenured voting, quality voting would be a
valuable shareholder cultivation mechanism. It would probably be
of greater effect for the discrete group of quality shareholders. It
would pose less risk than tenured voting of entrenching managers
after they decrease ownership because concentration levels would
still be counted. It would pose none of the downside risk of
increasing the voting power of ill-equipped indexers.
As with dual class and tenured voting, the exact terms could be
tailored to suit.359 Reliable references can draw upon the selection
criteria used by researchers in identifying the quality shareholder
358. See supra text accompanying note 336 (quoting the rule).
359. See supra text accompanying notes 312–15 (noting how dual class can vary voting
rights with the subject matter of the vote, among other ways); see supra text accompanying
note 319 (noting how tenured voting can vary voting power according to duration, multiple,
and subject matter of the vote).

76

1.CUNNINGHAM_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

77

2/9/2021 8:56 PM

Empowering Quality Shareholders

cohort, all of which is publicly filed with the SEC for most
institutional investors and relatively easy for reasonable investors
to determine from their regular records.
As to conviction, examples of such inputs are percentage of a
shareholder’s portfolio in the stock, average stock percentage in the
shareholder’s portfolio, and number of other stocks in the
portfolio.360 Companies could access the relevant databases of
scholars who maintain ongoing records of shareholder quality.361
To illustrate, consider a simple model comparing one-share,
one-vote first with tenured voting, and then with quality voting.
Imagine a simple shareholder base, where the period of ownership
of outstanding shares is about equally distributed among older
and newer shareholders and those in between—such as one-third
owned for less than one year, more than three years, and
in between.
With ninety-nine shares outstanding, each cohort controls
thirty-three votes. No single cohort can command the outcome of
any vote. But if time-weighted voting added three votes to each
share held longer than three years, then that cohort would have
ninety-nine votes, the others would still have thirty-three each and
a combined sixty-six votes. The seasoned cohort would then dictate
the outcome of every vote. But it is not obvious that such seasoning
translates into proportionally greater wisdom for a company.
Time-weighted Voting Power
Duration & Multiple Normal Votes
Time-weighted Votes
< 1 year = 1x
33
1x = 33
1–3 years = 1x
33
1x = 33
> 3 years = 3x
33
3x = 99
That invites consideration of quality voting. To take one of
the potential proxies for conviction, suppose these are shares
representing a substantial portion of a shareholder’s portfolio,
measured as a percentage of the shareholder’s total public
company equity portfolio. For example, two votes per share could
360. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59 (summarizing the criteria used in
Professor Bushee’s research).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62 (summarizing the methods and data of
both Professor Cremers and Borochin).
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be granted to shareholders allocating between one percent and five
percent of their portfolio to the company and three votes per share
to those allocating more than five percent. If tenured voting
implicitly assumes that longer-held shares cast higher-quality
votes, the hypothesis follows that shares owned by those with
greater exposure will also have such merit.
To adjust the previous illustration, suppose portfolio
concentration is randomly distributed across durations. Combining
duration with concentration, the short term unconcentrated cohort
would remain entitled to thirty-three votes while the longest
holding and most concentrated would enjoy 199 votes. Updating
the previous table that showed the effects of duration in tenured
voting, this table adds the effects of concentration.

None
Some
Substantial

Quality Voting Power
Duration Multiple
Concentration Multiple
< 1 year = no multiple < 1% x = no multiple
1–3 years = 2x
1–5%= 2x
> 3 years = 3x
> 5% = 3x

The outcome of any vote would be determined by a fluid
combination of shareholders boasting relatively longer durations
and higher concentrations. To complete the illustration, the next
table applies the multiples to the previous example of a company
with ninety-nine shares outstanding, with thirty-three each held for
varying durations and concentrations.
Votes Given Combinations of Concentration and Duration
Concentration
Duration
< 1% = no multiple 1–5% = 2x
> 5% = 3x
< 1 year = no
33
66
99
multiple
1–3 years = 2x 66
132
165
> 3 years = 3x 99
165
198
The shaded area reflects the number of votes commanded given concentration and
duration levels.

(This example presents the multiples in the proportion of 1–2–3.
That is a high magnitude of change in multiples, which may be too
78
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large for comfort in an experimental stage. More modest multiples
could be set, such as 1, 1.33, and 1.66; or even 1, 1.2, and 1.4.)
2. Pros and cons
Quality voting can be adopted by charter amendment
under state corporation law along with an application to the
stock exchange for a waiver of any restrictions on alternative
voting regimes. In this legal sense, it is akin to dual class or
tenured voting—all of which are easier than the variations of
anti-indexer regimes, which would require legal changes and
related political support.
As with dual class and tenured voting, quality voting enables
each company to design the details and tailor the arrangements to
suit in a joint exercise involving solely board and shareholder
approval. Each company must weigh the following costs and
benefits of adoption.
Administrative burdens may be high. While the five-year-old
experience in France suggests that administration is feasible, the
U.S. system has some different features. One problem is how most
U.S. equity is held in the names of depository nominees rather than
ultimate owners, complicating the task of tracking ownership
concentration.362 Recordkeeping and calculations can be complex,
especially for large institutions investing through multiple
funds, including those with diverse mixes of debt, equity, and
other securities.363

362. See Edelman, supra note 4, at 297 (drawing on David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness:
The Problem at the Core of the U.S. Proxy System and Its Solution, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41, 50
(2011)). In brief, before the 1970s, share ownership records were maintained manually in a
traditional paper recording system maintained by individual brokerage firms. Trading
volume proved too much for such a system, however, creating backlogs in updating transfer
records. To meet this challenge, the industry developed a computerized system maintained
in a central depository, called the Depository Trust Company (DTC). Today, the vast
majority of stock is held through DTC, with stock formally owned by its nominee,
Cede & Co., and held in the name of the brokerage firm that arranged the purchase (called
“street name” on behalf of the “beneficial” owner).
363. Corporations must maintain stockholder lists to determine associated rights, on
voting and other matters. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(a) (2020). In the process,
companies contact DTC to enumerate the breakdown of brokers holding shares through
Cede. The Cede breakdown can be cumbersome, can involve numerous interactions between
the company and DTC, and is error-prone. Edelman et al., supra note 4, at 1004. Such
challenges and risks multiply for companies with peculiar voting rules, such as tenured
voting, as this requires additional information such as duration of holdings.
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In fact, companies that rescinded tenured voting often cited
administrative complexity as a reason.364 Administering
commitment-weighted voting would pose additional cost,
particularly in recordkeeping and verification. For example,
duration is a fixed measure of time, whereas concentration can vary
substantially over time.
On the other hand, those companies that maintain tenured
voting invoked common solutions. For example, one common
solution to the challenge of street name ownership was to deem
street name stock as low vote.365 Such an approach could be
modified by making that a presumption that each shareholder
would have the right to challenge.
Such a simple approach can be implemented immediately for
all shareholders, including individuals, by shifting the burden of
disclosure to the shareholder: any shareholder wishing to exercise
quality shares would be required to submit qualifying evidence to
the corporate secretary accordingly. The corporate secretary can
create uniform rules describing what evidence qualifies and
standardized procedures to verify it.
Moreover, holdings are readily observable from public filings
for institutional investors and can be verified by reference to
disclosure that is legally required and subject to federal anti-fraud
rules. For these shareholders, enhanced voting power could be
made optional and subject to the company’s confirmation of
verified shareholder applications.
Just as technology helped solve the paper crisis, technology is
likely again to solve the street name problem, including the
administration of special voting rules. Advances in tracking
technology, particularly digital ledgers based on blockchain tools,
promise to make administration of quality voting manageable. In
2017, Delaware corporate law was amended to permit companies
to use blockchain (or distributed ledgering) to maintain their
shareholder lists.366 These enable digital records showing every
transaction involving every share of stock, with precise details of

364. See Edelman et al., supra note 4, at 1005 n.89 (quoting Church & Dwight Co., Inc.,
Proxy Statement (Form PRE 14A), at 27 (Mar. 21, 2003)).
365. See Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 602.
366. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c).
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beneficial rather than street ownership as well as duration and
other data.367
In any event, such costs must be compared to the gains. In
general, gains can be approximated by reference to some of the
common contexts where suboptimal voting has been recognized.
These would include many of the instances where indexers have
conflicts of interest as well as the legal contexts in which courts
have recognized transient shareholder appetites to be problematic.
Under quality voting, finally, activist shareholders may often
gain enhanced power when they hold meaningful stakes for long
periods. Voting power could also increase during the course of
multi-year campaigns, as more votes accrue over time. Both points
may attract activists, but while managers may see some associated
costs, they will be activists more patient and focused than other
shareholders, producing comparative gains.
Assuming administrative costs are generally similar for most
companies and nontrivial, the ultimate issue is how given
companies weigh the advantages of attracting a higher density of
quality shareholders. To recap such advantages from Section I.E,
first, quality shareholders offset all the disadvantages of other
cohorts by deterring overzealous activism, balancing short-term
pressures, and contributing informed decision-makers that
indexers rarely offer. Second, quality shareholders offer the
prospect of outstanding director nominees, the benefit of unpaid
consulting advice, and connections to other strategic business
opportunities. Third, quality shareholders promote more rational
stock pricing, being more interested in a close connection between
stock price and business value than a high stock price for its
own sake.
Companies will almost certainly value such advantages
differently, and the relative magnitude of these benefits will vary
across companies. For example, companies enjoying other sources
of insulation from activist pressure or indifferent to short term
stock market pressures may care less about quality shareholders
than those facing such pressures. For the latter cohort, the benefits
of quality shareholders may well dwarf the administrative costs.
Accordingly, while this Article’s analysis does not warrant—
367. See Edelman et al., supra note 4, at 1006 (explaining that these tools would be a
“great advantage” for tenure voting to “make it easier for companies to trace the identity of
their shareholders and therefore more accurately assign high and low voting rights”).
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and the Article does not prescribe—general adoption of quality
voting, the argument readily encourages enthusiastic consideration
by the cohort for whom more quality shareholders would likely
add net value.
CONCLUSION
Shareholders that buy large stakes and hold for long periods
offer numerous advantages to the companies in which they invest.
Companies wishing to attract more of them would do well to adopt
policies and practices that entice them. An obvious method would
grant them superior voting rights to short-term and diversified
shareholders. This Article reaches this solution by originally
combining the horizon debate (shorter versus longer investment
horizons) with the conviction debate (lower versus higher
investment concentration) to better incentivize quality shareholders.
Why have quality shareholders, including Warren Buffett, been
neglected in the corporate law scholarship on horizon, conviction,
and shareholder voting? One possibility is the familiar difference
between theory and practice. Scholars work with theories that may
or may not map onto actual behaviors. A tension sometimes resides
between academic and practical perspectives in scholarly work.368
The last generation of corporate law and finance scholarship,
for instance, saw a disconnect between modern finance theory and
Buffett.369 Theorists developed the efficient capital market
hypothesis, capital asset pricing model, and modern portfolio
theory as a construct that contradicted most everything Buffett
thought and did—the theorists even suggested that he could not
have done what he did.370 The theories being developed in today’s
corporate law debates recall a flavor of that gap, where the light
shines on short-term activists and long-term indexers but none at
all on the long-term, concentrated, quality shareholder.
As Professor Bebchuk and his colleagues have noted in one of
their many major contributions to the conviction debate, they are
368. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 101, 106 (1997) (exploring a theoretical model that has little practical use).
369. See Lowenstein, supra note 24, at 934.
370. Id. (reviewing finance theory of the era, during which theorists simply ignored
Buffett’s record, wished it away, or dismissed him as an outlier). As one scholar wrote, “[I]t
is odd, is it not, that not one EMT theorist has seen fit to study Buffett? . . . The response to
Buffett has been either a deafening silence or a clumsy attempt to avoid the engagement.” Id.
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putting forward a theory of institutional investor incentives that
predicts impoverished decision making while acknowledging that
actual decision making may be superior to the model.371 Other
scholars in this debate likewise theorize and model without
necessarily accounting for all relevant incentives of all the diverse
actors, especially quality shareholders.
“Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will never work in
theory,” Buffett has famously quipped.372 Quality shareholding
works in practice and requires only slight adjustment to work in
theory. Both theory and practice will be richer when horizon and
conviction are combined for study and the quality shareholder’s
role is explored. This Article lights the way.

371. Bebchuk et al., supra note 241, at 90 (“We recognize that well-meaning investment
managers of index funds and active mutual funds may sometimes make stewardship
decisions that are superior to those suggested purely by their incentive calculus. Our focus,
however, is on understanding the structural incentive problems that should be recognized
in assessing the current governance landscape.”).
372. See Katherine Florey, Big Conflicts Little Conflicts. 47 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 683, 685 (2015)
(quoting Buffett’s “famous quip”).
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